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Introduction
The “End of History” theory in corporate law, developed by Professors
Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, asserts that corporate laws
around the world are converging toward a “single, standard model” based
on commonly accepted best practices that are economically most effi-
cient.1  The two scholars maintain that the failure of alternative models
(including the manager-oriented, labor-oriented, state-oriented, and stake-
holder models), together with the competitive pressure of global commerce
and the shift of interest-group influence in favor of shareholders,2 has led
to the assured “triumph of the shareholder-oriented model of the corpora-
tion over its principal competitors.”3
The text of Gongsi Fa (Company Law),4 a national law that governs
business companies in China, provides great examples for readers who are
looking for signs of convergence. Several of the provisions of Gongsi Fa
suggest that the corporate form in China contains fundamental characteris-
tics of the corporation which are the same as or similar to the functional
features of companies in other jurisdictions: “(1) legal personality; (2) lim-
ited liability; (3) transferable shares; (4) centralized management under a
board structure; and (5) shared ownership by contributors of capital.”5
Many examples of these characteristics exist in the Gongsi Fa.  For
instance, Article 3 defines the company as “an enterprise legal person,
which has independent property of a legal person and enjoys the property
rights of a legal person.”6  Further, Article 3 explicitly provides that share-
holders are liable to the company— and the company’s creditors— to the
extent of the equity interest or shares of the company they have purchased
or subscribed to.7  The spirit of Article 3, embodying the universal core
1. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 439, 439 2000– 2001); see also REINIER R. KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF
CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (2009).
2. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 443– 49.
3. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 468.
4. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi Fa ( ) [The
Company Law of the People’s Republic of China] [hereinafter Gongsi Fa] (promulgated
by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1993, effective July 1, 1994,
revised by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan 1.
2006) (China). Gongsi Fa was the first national companies law enacted by the PRC, and
it was adopted by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Decem-
ber 29, 1993.  Since its promulgation, it has been revised four times, in 1999, 2004,
2005, and 2013.  The 2005 revision changed most provisions of the law, resulting in a
text that was almost new.  For this reason, the existing law is often called the 2005
Gongsi Fa.  The 2013 revision loosens the requirements on capital contributions and
capital maintenance, making it possible to register a company in China with very low or
even zero capital.
5. KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 5. See also Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note
1, at 439– 40.
6. Gongsi Fa, supra note 4, at art. 3.
7. See id.
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features of the corporation, is reflected throughout the text of various pro-
visions of the Gongsi Fa throughout its text.  In particular, the 2005 Gongsi
Fa has abandoned most of the restrictive rules on company incorporation
and governance that originated in China’s planned economy, and intro-
duced new rules in line with international practice.8
These signs of convergence have led many scholars, practitioners, and
international organizations to believe that corporate governance in Chinese
companies can be understood and analyzed along the lines of the separa-
tion of ownership and control.  As such, research on various issues relating
to corporate governance in China has been conducted as if the property
owner, investor, or shareholder of the company “surrenders his wealth to
those in control of the corporation [so] that he has exchanged the position
of independent owner for one in which he may become merely recipient of
the wages of capital.”9  Examples of these issues include agency costs,
8. The China Securities Regulatory Commission noted that the 2005 Gongsi Fa has
the following improvements:
[It] improved companies’ governance structure and mechanisms to protect law-
ful shareholders’ rights and public interests.  It highlighted the legal obligations
and responsibilities of those in actual control of the company— the directors,
senior management and supervisors.  It improved companies’ financing and
financial accounting systems of companies and the systems governing corporate
mergers, divisions and liquidation.  While ensuring the lawful rights and inter-
ests of the creditors are well protected, it facilitated the reorganization of
companies.
See Corporate Governance of Listed Companies in China: Self-Assessment by the China
Securities Regulatory Commission (2011), ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION
AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/10/484449
85.pdf.
9. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 355 (1932).  For some of the existing work on corporate governance and enter-
prise reform (especially SOE reform) in China, see Xu Xiaonian & Wang Yan, Ownership
Structure, Corporate Governance, and Firm’s Performance: The Case of Chinese Stock Com-
panies, 1794 WORK BANK POLICY RESEARCH (1997); STOYAN TENEV & CHUNLIN ZHANG,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ENTERPRISE REFORM IN CHINA: BUILDING THE INSTITUTIONS OF
MODERN MARKETS (2002); ROSS GARNAUT, SONG LIGANG, STOYAN TENEV & YAO YANG,
CHINA’S OWNERSHIP TRANSFORMATION: PROCESS, OUTCOMES, PROSPECTS (2005); SHAHID
YUSUF, KAORU NABESHIMA & DWIGHT H. PERKINS, UNDER NEW OWNERSHIP: PRIVATIZING
CHINA’S STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES (2006); OECD, REFORMING CHINA’S ENTERPRISES
(2000); CHARLES A. PIGGOT, OECD, CHINA IN THE WORLD ECONOMY: THE DOMESTIC POL-
ICY CHALLENGES (2002); Carsten A. Holz, Long Live China’s State-owned Enterprises:
Deflating the Myth of Poor Financial Performance, 13 J. ASIAN ECON. 493 (2002); Hua,
Jinyang, Paul Miesing & Mingfang Li, An Empirical Taxonomy of SOE Governance in Tran-
sitional China, 10 J. MGMT GOVERNANCE 401 (2006); Liu Qiao, Corporate Governance in
China: Current Practices, Economic Effects and Institutional Determinants, 52 CESIFO
ECON. STUD. 415 (2006); Cyril Lin, Corporatization and Corporate Governance in China’s
Economic Transition, 34 ECON. PLAN. 5 (2001); Li Shaomin & Xia Jun, The Roles and
Performance of State Firms and Non-state Firms in China’s Economic Transition, 36 WORLD
DEV. 39 (2008); Lu Yuan & Yao Jun, Impact of State Ownership and Control Mechanisms
on the Performance of Group Affiliated Companies in China, 23 ASIA PACIFIC J. MGMT. 485
(2006); Chang, Eric C. & Sonia M.L. Wong, Political Control and Performance in China’s
Listed Companies, 32 J. COMP. ECON. 617 (2004); Donald C. Clarke, Corporate Govern-
ance in China: An Overview, 14 CHINA ECON. REV. 494 (2003); Sonia M.L. Wong, Sonja
Opper & Ruyin Hu, Shareholding Structure, Depoliticization and Firm Performance, 12
ECON. TRANSITION 29 (2004); Takao Kato & Cheryl Long, CEO Turnover, Firm Perform-
ance, and Enterprise Reform in China: Evidence from Micro Data, 34 J. COMP. ECON. 796
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board structure and decision-making, CEO turnover, executive pay, the
relationship between owner identity and firm performance, and enterprise
reform.  As Lin and Milhaupt have succinctly observed, scholars on corpo-
rate governance in China “often begin and end their analyses by
benchmarking the governance attributes of Chinese listed companies
against global (which typically means U.S.) corporate governance stan-
dards and institutions.”10  In so doing, scholars are probably able to tell
“what the Chinese system lacks,” but not “how it is constructed and actu-
ally functions.”11
International organizations, such as the World Bank and the OECD,
have engaged China extensively on corporate governance issues in recent
years.  The prescriptions the organizations have offered to China follow
“international best practices,” which are still based on the separation of
ownership and control.  These prescriptions treat the parties of corporate
governance in China as shareholders, managers, and stakeholders in a
commercial entity located in a market economy of a democratic system.12
Since 2004, the OECD has organized several policy dialogues with Chinese
authorities.13  One of the key aims of the dialogues was to encourage “use
of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and OECD Guidelines on
Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises.”14  Arguably, the afore-
said OECD Principles and Guidelines, although internationally agreed
upon and widely accepted, are rooted in Western models of corporate gov-
ernance.15  In essence, they require (1) strong legal protection of share-
holders and (2) the independence of the board of directors.16  The Chinese
(2006); SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE RESEARCH CENTER, ZHONGGUO GONGSI ZHILI BAOGAO
( ) [CHINA CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REPORT 2003] (2003); SHANGHAI
STOCK EXCHANGE RESEARCH CENTER, ZHONGGUO GONGSI ZHILI BAOGAO: DONGSHIHUI DULIX-
ING YU YOUXIAOXING ( ) [CHINA CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE REPORT: THE INDEPENDENCE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BOARD OF DIREC-
TORS] (2004); SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE RESEARCH CENTER, ZHONGGUO GONGSI ZHILI
BAOGAO: GUOYOU KONGGU GONGSI SHANGSHI ZHILI
( ) [CHINA CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REPORT:
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN STATE-CONTROLLED LISTED COMPANIES] (2006).
10. Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We Are the (National) Champions: Understand-
ing the Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L. REV. 697, 701 (2013).
11. Id.
12. See generally Corporate Governance of Listed Companies in China: Self-Assessment
by the China Securities Regulatory Commission, OECD (2011).
13. See China-OECD corporate governance policy dialogue, OECD, http://www.oecd
.org/china/china-oecdcorporategovernancepolicydialogue.htm (last visited Feb. 15,
2014).
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Justin Iu & Jonathan Batten, The Implementation of OECD Corporate
Governance Principles in Post-Crisis Asia, 4 J. CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP 47, 48 (2001).
However, the OECD has also taken into account the experiences of non-OECD countries
in its more recent version of the Principles. See, e.g., Abdussalam Mahmoud Abu-
Tapanjeh, Corporate governance from the Islamic perspective: A comparative analysis with
OECD principles, 20 CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING 556, 559 (2009) (stating that
the 2004 OECD revision reflects not only the experience of OECD countries but also the
emerging and developing economies).
16. The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 2004 are organized into six broad
parts: I. Ensuring the Basis for an Effective Corporate Governance Framework; II. The
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government even provided a self-assessment on China’s compliance with
the OECD Principles to the OECD, completed by the China Securities Reg-
ulatory Commission (CSRC),17 in the way a good student would report the
learning process to his teacher.
Both the academic analysis and the engagement approach of interna-
tional organizations mentioned above tend to ignore an essential dimen-
sion of corporate governance in China, especially in state-owned
enterprises (SOEs): the political control of state enterprises by the Party-
state that comingles the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the CCP-
controlled government.  In a society based on private property, an investor
abandons property rights to his assets when he invests his assets as capital
in enterprise.  In exchange, this investor becomes a shareholder.  Although
he is customarily called an “owner”, he does not literally own the firm or
its assets.  Instead, he acts as a shareholder and exercises shareholder
rights.  As a result of the separation of ownership and control by law and
contracts, the power to manage the company is shifted to the board of
directors and managers.  The board and managers control the company,
and their authority is only subject to constraints written in the contract
with the shareholder (often in the form of the company’s articles of associ-
ation) and the regulatory power of the state.  However, the state normally
has no economic stake in the company. The state claims that it regulates
for the public good.  This shareholder-based control is typical for Anglo-
American companies, and it has become increasingly popular in other
jurisdictions with the continuing Americanization of corporate governance
across the world in recent decades.18
It would be wrong to make the same assumption about the corporate
world in China for several reasons.  First, a large portion of Chinese com-
panies are SOEs.19  In fact, SOEs constitute the most important pillar of
the Chinese economy.  Most of the large enterprises, including most of the
listed companies, are state-owned.  In contrast, SOEs are either rare or
insignificant in other major economies.  Second, the state is both the con-
trolling shareholder and the regulator of SOEs.20  It is both the judge and
the most powerful player in corporate China.  Third, although Chinese
SOEs are legally organized in the corporate form featuring all or most
attributes of the separation of ownership and control model, the real con-
trol comes from the CCP, or the Party-state.  The Party-state controls SOEs
Rights of Shareholders and Key Ownership Functions; III. The Equitable Treatment of
Shareholders; IV. The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance; V. Disclosure and
Transparency; and VI. The Responsibilities of the Board. See Principles of Corporate Gov-
ernance 2004, OECD (2004).
17. See OECD (2011), supra note 8.
18. See Douglas M. Branson, The Very Uncertain Prospect of “Global” Convergence in
Corporate Governance, 34 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 321, 343 (2001).
19. Gao Xu, State-owned enterprises in China: How big are they?, THE WORLD BANK
(Jan. 19, 2010), http://blogs.worldbank.org/eastasiapacific/state-owned-enterprises-in-
china-how-big-are-they.
20. Mariana Pargendler, State Ownership and Corporate Governance, FORDHAM L.
REV. 2917, 2943– 944 (2012).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\47-3\CIN305.txt unknown Seq: 6 12-JAN-15 9:10
636 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 47
through both general requirements on policy compliance and specific pow-
ers such as appointing the senior executives of SOEs.21  This is a phenome-
non largely unique to China, a country that is ironically rather open to
international trade and investment.  State and business may be very close
in some other economies with SOEs, such as Korea, Japan, Singapore or
Brazil, but a degree of direct control over SOEs by an economy’s ruling
party is rarely seen in other open economies.22
Party-state control of SOEs in China is a puzzle to many observers.  If,
as the Party-state has vowed it would many times since 1992, the state
determines to steer the country toward a true market economy,23 it should
follow the neo-liberal teaching of privatizing SOEs.  At the least, it should
allow the SOEs to be truly independent legal persons with the autonomy to
operate purely on a commercial basis.  Instead, as illustrated below, the
Party-state in China directly controls not only the personnel but also some-
times the operation of SOEs, bypassing the legal governance structure con-
sisting of the board of directors and management.24  On the other hand, if
the underlying purpose of the CCP’s SOE policy is to control the state
firms as tightly as possible, one might be curious about why the Party-state
has promulgated— and enforced to a large degree— so many national laws,
regulations and rules to institutionalize corporate governance, many of
which set legal procedures and restrictions to limit external interference of
enterprise management and governance.  Further, if Lord Acton’s most
famous pronouncement, “Power tends to corrupt and absolute power cor-
rupts absolutely”25 is true, the Party-state’s predatory hands would have
destroyed Chinese SOEs a long time ago.  Although SOEs experienced
gloomy days in the 1980s and 1990s, they are rather successful and pros-
21. Adam Hersh, China’s State-Owned Enterprises and Nonmarket Economics, Testi-
mony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (Feb. 21,
2014), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/china/report/2014/03/05/
85372/chinas-state-owned-enterprises-and-nonmarket-economics.
22. A special report on state capitalism by The Economist states, “What might be
called the ‘party state’ [of China] exercises a degree of control over the economy that is
unparalleled in the rest of the state-capitalist world.” A choice of models: Theme and
variations, in Special report: State capitalism, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 21, 2012, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/21542924.
23. The most recent articulation of this policy is in a 2013 Party resolution stating
that “[t]he basic economic system [of China] should evolve on the decisive role of the
market in resource allocation.” The reform plan announced sweeping changes across
broad swathes of China’s economic, social, and governance systems. See Zhonggong
Zhongyang Guanyu Quanmian Shenhua Gaige Ruogan Zhongda Wenti de Jueding
( ) [Decision on Major Issues Concern-
ing Comprehensively Deepening Reforms], adopted at the Third Plenum of the 18th
CCP Central Committee on 12 November 2013, available at http://news.xinhuanet
.com/politics/2013-11/15/c_118164235.htm.  [hereinafter CCP Decision on Major Issues
(2013)].
24. See Party sets course for next decade, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 16, 2013, available at
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-11/16/content_17110079.htm.
25. JOHN EMERICH EDWARD DALBERG, LORD ACTON, ACTON-CREIGHTON CORRESPON-
DENCE (1887), available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/acton-acton-creighton-corre
spondence#lf1524_label_010.
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perous these days.26
This paper attempts to adopt a political approach to analyze the rela-
tionship between the state and state-owned business in China, focusing on
the corporate control and governance of SOEs.  It aims to explain the politi-
cal logic behind the Party-state’s achievements in introducing market
reforms through communist political institutions and to discuss their
implications for future SOE reform in China.  It argues that SOE reform is
part of the CCP’s effort to rebuild and maintain political legitimacy of the
Chinese Party-state.  In other words, the management of legitimacy to
strengthen the ruling position of the CCP is embodied in all major aspects
of the governance structures of SOEs.  Corporate governance in Chinese
SOEs is a system in which the components come from different countries
of origin, but are installed together to ensure the whole system runs in ways
that not only economically benefit the owner but also stay within the
owner’s control.
Part I of this paper introduces the theoretical framework of legitimacy
management.  Part II examines the developmental path of SOEs in China
since their inception at the early stage of the PRC.  Part III discusses the
“twin governance structure” in SOEs, which is comprised of a structure for
legal governance and a second structure for political governance— namely,
CCP control of SOEs.  The two structures run separately but intersect in
the decision-making process in SOEs.  Part IV explains the political logic of
SOE governance to examine how legitimacy management considerations
are embodied within it.  Part V discusses the implications of the twin gov-
ernance structure for future SOE reform in China.
I. Legitimacy Management in Government Regulation of Business in
China: The Conceptual Framework
A. A Conceptual Framework of Legitimacy Management
Political legitimacy can be broadly defined to include “both citizens’
trust in public officials and their conviction that governmental institutions
are fair, responsive, and valuable.”27  It deals with a fundamental question
about “who deserves to have authority and why.”28  As Weber noted, “So
far as it is not derived merely from fear or from motives of expedience, a
willingness to submit to an order . . . always in some sense implies a belief
in the legitimate authority of the source imposing it.”29  Put simply, a legiti-
mate regime, whether it is good, peaceful, or democratic, is accepted by the
people (or the majority of the people) as a government with political
authority.
26. See Patrick Foulis, Business in Asia: How to keep roaring, THE ECONOMIST, May 31,
2014, available at http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21602825-over-past-
two-decades-asias-companies-have-enjoyed-huge-success-now-they-need.
27. Bert Useem & Michael Useem, Government Legitimacy and Political Stability, 57
SOC. FORCES 840, 841 (1979).
28. Guo Baogang, Political Legitimacy and China’s Transition, 8 J. CHINESE POL. SCI. 1,
2 (2003).
29. MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 132 (1964).
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Broadly, political legitimacy has two aspects: control of power and
popular acceptance.30  Legitimacy cannot be taken for granted by the ruler,
even though the ruler has taken control of the territory of a country.  As
Lipset points out, it also “involves the capacity of the [political] system to
engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are
the most appropriate ones for the society.”31  In other words, legitimacy
must be managed in order to be viable and sustainable; it is a continuous
process.  Political legitimacy management involves three tasks: gaining
legitimacy, maintaining legitimacy, and repairing legitimacy.32  A political
regime, after gaining power, must constantly take measures to win and
maintain public acceptance of its authority to rule.  Specifically, the regime
must fulfill the following tasks, which, although often in conflict with each
other, need to be deployed concurrently and balanced carefully: (1) con-
centration and preservation of power; (2) promotion and maintenance of
the ruler’s ideology; (3) coordination of interest groups politics; (4) control
of bureaucratic politics (departmentalism) and official rent-seeking (cor-
ruption); (5) pursuit of good policy to rationalize governance, including
institutional building; and (6) creation of an interface to establish legiti-
macy in the international society.33
B. Legitimacy Management in China
As an authoritarian Party-state, the Chinese government cannot base
its legitimacy on democratic elections.  This, however, does not mean the
regime is one without legitimacy.  Guo argues that political legitimacy in
the Chinese context can be understood from the perspectives of original
justification and utilitarian justification.34  Original justification, tracing
the origin of the ruling authority, refers to four Chinese concepts: mandate
of Heaven (tianming), rule by virtue (dezhi), popular consent (minben), and
legality (hefa).35  Utilitarian justification addresses “the capacity of the rul-
ers to meet people’s needs, such as material well-being or physical secur-
ity.”36  Utilitarian justification addresses managing legitimacy in a direct
way, namely “maintain[ing] people’s belief that the political system is legiti-
mate.”37  In the Chinese context, this entails that the government, as a pro-
vider of benefits, should implement public policies which are consistent
with the concepts of “benefiting the people” (limin) and “equality of
wealth” (junfu).38  In short, the Chinese cognitive pattern of political legiti-
30. See id.  See also David Beetham, Max Weber and the Legitimacy of the Modern
State, 13 ANALYSE & KRITIK 34 (1991).
31. SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN: THE SOCIAL BASES OF POLITICS 64 (1983).
32. See Mark C. Suchman, Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional
Approaches, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 571, 586 (1995).
33. For discussions on some of the conditions, see FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, STATE-BUILD-
ING: GOVERNANCE AND WORLD ORDER IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2004).
34. Guo, supra note 28, at 3.
35. Id. at 3– 5.
36. Id. at 3.
37. Id. at 5.
38. Id. at 6.
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macy can be stated as follows:39
[A] ruler, who has the mandate of Heaven, possesses the quality of virtue,
shows respect to his subjects, follows the rules of the ancestors, and tries to
win the hearts and minds of the people, will be considered a just and legiti-
mate one.  A just ruler will strengthen his legitimacy by promoting policies
that will benefit the people, not himself, by ensuring relatively equal distri-
bution of these benefits, and by allowing the people to do what they do the
best.
It is no surprise that the primary purpose of the CCP is maintaining
its status as the sole ruling Party of the Chinese state.  For the CCP, staying
in power is not achieved through free elections.  Instead, it must use other
means to hold on to power, which are centered on two key elements: con-
trolling resources and delivering performance.40  The former involves the
control of the country’s economic, political, and social resources so that
citizens depend on the ruling Party, and the latter entails delivery of sus-
tained improvements in consumption and living standards for the Chinese
people through economic growth.  In the Reform Era, political legitimacy
management has focused on the following agenda, with the ultimate goal
of preserving the CCP’s power base: maintaining the dominant status of
the CCP’s evolving ideology, maintaining social stability, pursuing good
policy to build institutions and rationalize governance, balancing the con-
flicting objectives of interest groups, and containing departmentalism and
corruption.41
1. Controlling Financial Resources for Solidifying the CCP’s Economic
Powerbase
To rule in China, the Party-state has to ensure that it controls suffi-
cient financial and non-financial resources.  This objective determines, to a
large extent, the state’s policy-orientations towards state- and private-
owned enterprises.  In other words, SOEs provide the economic foundation
for the CCP’s reign as they not only enable the Party-state to pay for the
requisite human and political expenses, but also cause the citizens of
China to depend on the Party-state for a living.
2. Maintaining Official Ideology
“Ideological adaptation and innovation are thus seen as the prerequi-
site of relegitimating party rule.”42  Party scholars in China assert that “ide-
ology fulfills various functions crucial to political, social and economic life,
such as interpreting political order, cementing national identity, mobilizing
support, and reducing economic transaction costs by enhancing social
39. Guo, supra note 28, at 7.
40. See Hersh, supra note 21.
41. See Thomas Heberer & Gunter Schubert, Political Reform and Regime Legitimacy
in Contemporary China, 99 ASIEN 9 (2006).
42. Bruce Gilley & Heike Holbig, The Debate on Party Legitimacy in China: a mixed
quantitative/qualitative analysis, 18 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 339, 346 (2009).
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trust.”43
In the 1980s and early 1990s, the battle over Marxism and capitalism
in China was still intense.  Reformers at that time had to face tough ques-
tions from the conservatives when a particular public policy could possi-
bly lead to capitalism.  They had to convince the conservative leaders and
officials that the public policy or project was not only in line with the offi-
cial ideology, but would also promote it.44
With the gradual demise of support for Marxism, nationalism became
the new favored ideology.  It now “serves as an integral part and important
ingredient of ideological modernization”45 and the Chinese state increas-
ingly employs it to justify its legitimacy.  Any major public policy, if charac-
terized as something that may contribute to China’s rise to a superpower,
its national unity, or its “national self-confidence and pride,” could easily
gain public support.46  In this context, the securities market, featuring the
most listed companies as SOEs, has been promoted as being crucial to
China’s “peaceful ascendancy to the status of a great power.”47
3. Maintaining Stability
Bearing in mind the chaos and turmoil of the Mao Era, Chinese leader-
ship since Deng Xiaoping has been obsessed with maintaining social sta-
bility.48  Deng Xiaoping’s famous 1989 phrase, “stability overrides
everything,” has been carried out throughout the Reform Era.49  All govern-
ment agencies at the central and local levels are required to vigorously
maintain political and social stability.  The major report to the 2002 Six-
teenth CCP Congress stated, “It is essential for the Party to give top priority
to development [but] stability is a prerequisite for reform and develop-
ment.”50  The stability orientation has had a significant impact on the
behavior of officials and regulators.  In the case of economic regulation,
this may mean that regulators have to intervene in the market activities to
maintain political stability, even though doing so may undermine market
efficiency.
43. Id.
44. Liu Hongru, the first Chairman of the CSRC, wrote about how he was criticized
at a committee meeting of the National People’s Congress (NPC) in 1992; the conserva-
tive legislators stated that all systems of shareholding and stock markets would lead to
privatization (and hence the collapse of socialism). See LIU HONGRU, TUPO –  ZHONGGUO
ZIBEN SHICHANG FAZHAN ZHI LU (( ) [BREAKTHROUGH— THE
PATHWAY OF CHINA’S CAPITAL MARKETS], Vol. 1, p. 19 (Beijing: Zhongguo Jinrong
Chubanshe).
45. Gilley & Holbig, supra note 42, at 349.
46. Gilley & Holbig, supra note 42, at 350.
47. Qi Bin, Ziben Shichang yu Daguo Jueqi ( ) [Capital Markets
and the Rise of Great Powers], occasional research paper (2009), Research Department of
the China Securities Regulatory Commission, http://www.csrc.gov.cn.
48. JOSEPH FEWSMITH, CHINA SINCE TIANMANMEN 79 (2001) (“Chinese policy makers
(not just ‘hardliners’) and intellectuals . . . are keenly aware of the turmoil of twentieth-
century politics and worry openly about the costs of political imposition.”).
49. Id. at 35.
50. KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION THROUGH REFORM 317
(2004).
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4. Managing Interest Groups
The absence of democracy does not necessarily mean that China lacks
special interest groups.  As ownership has increasingly dispersed and soci-
ety becomes more diversified, different interest groups have emerged.51
The “life-cycle” accounts of the regulatory capture theory suggest that regu-
latory agencies go through various stages, from vigorously enforcing rules
at the beginning of its establishment to becoming the protectors of the reg-
ulated as it reaches maturity.52  Regulatory capture in China takes place in
a different context: the regulated enterprises were initially created or spon-
sored by the regulators.  During the planned-economy period, China estab-
lished a central power structure that divided the administration of all
aspects of the national economy among different agencies, with most agen-
cies running state-run enterprises.53  Premier Zhu Rongji’s Government
Restructuring Project in 1998 deprived most economic agencies of their
direct powers and interests over domestic industries and significantly
weakened the ministries-industries complex.54  But even after this reform,
SOEs found protection from the remaining government agencies.  These
agencies, driven both by ideological traditions and departmental benefits
such as “soft money income,” as long as the SOEs remained state-owned
and continued to funnel economic benefits to them.  Over time, a Chinese
style of departmentalism (benwei zhuyi) has emerged as one of the most
salient features in Chinese politics.55
5. Curbing Official Rent-seeking
The public sector in China has a notorious reputation for being cor-
rupt.  As Pei Pinxin has observed, corruption “undermines the legitimacy
of the ruling [CCP], fuels social unrest, contributes directly to the rise in
socioeconomic inequality. . . .[Ultimately,] if the Party fails to curb corrup-
tion, China will most likely witness the rise of a form of authoritarian
crony-capitalism that marries unaccountable political power with ill-gotten
private wealth.”56  Corruption tends to concentrate in sectors that involve
extensive state investment or heavy state regulation.57  The Chinese gov-
51. ANTHONY OGUS, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY 57 (2004).
52. See id.
53. Su Chen, The Establishment and Development of Chinese Economic Legal System in
the Past 60 Years, Institute of Law and Institute of International Law, Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences, available at http://www.iolaw.org.cn/global/en/showNews.asp?id=245
58.
54. David Zweig, China’s Stalled “Fifth Wave”: Zhu Rongji’s Reform Package of
1998– 2000, 41 ASIAN SURVEY 231, 233– 34 (2001).
55. For example, departmentalism in the legislative process was said to have four
common manifestations: “(1) Using the law to expand a department’s rights beyond its
own sphere; (2) Using law to push one department’s duties onto another department;
(3) Using law to force resolution of larger problems a department cannot solve in its
daily work; (4) Drafting laws which are either illegal or unconstitutional.” See MURRAY
SCOT TANNER, THE POLITICS OF LAWMAKING IN POST-MAO CHINA: INSTITUTIONS, PROCESSES
AND DEMOCRATIC PROSPECTS 120 (1999).
56. Pei Minxin, Corruption Threatens China’s Future, 55 POL’Y BRIEF 230 (2007).
57. Id. at 238.
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ernment acknowledges the problem, but whether it is able to wage an effec-
tive war against corruption remains an open question.  Fighting corruption
needs not only the rule of law, but also the commitment of the political
elites to relinquish opportunities to use public office to gain private bene-
fits.58  Many anti-corruption measures have been adopted in China,59 but
their success within the current political framework eventually depends on
whether the CCP’s good policy can override the rent-seeking temptations.
At least for now, the central leadership has been successful in casting itself
as an opponent of corruption.60
6. Pursuing Good Policy
Political approaches based on public choice theory to interpreting eco-
nomic regulation in China tend to underestimate Chinese leadership’s
commitment to pursue good public policy, which is understood mainly as
economic policies serving the purpose of modernizing China.61  Leaving
aside the controversial debate over Mao Zedong’s motives for launching the
Cultural Revolution, it is widely recognized that the central leadership after
Mao has been consistently seeking for the right path through which China
can achieve modernization.62  For the current CCP, this means delivering
economic performance through effective government policies, as well as
taking into consideration the interests of other social groups in policy-
making.
Zheng Yongnian characterizes the CCP as “an organizational emperor”
which “wields its power in a way similar to Chinese emperors of the
past.”63  Playing such a role, “the CCP cannot achieve national leadership
and become a hegemonic organization, if it confines itself only to its own
organizational interests or the interests of the social forces upon which it
58. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Political Economy of Corruption, in KIMBERLY ANN
ELLIOTT, CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 34 (1997) (stating “An effective anticor-
ruption strategy should both reduce the benefits and costs under the control of public
agents and limit their discretion to allocate gains and impose harms”).
59. See Eric M. Pedersen, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act And Its Application To U.S.
Business Operations In China, 7 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 13, 14 (2008).
60. See Fu Hualing, Stability and Anticorruption Initiatives: Is There a Chinese Model?
2 (University of Hong Kong Working Paper No. 032, 2013), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2293025.
61. The Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party states, “In building socialism,
the basic task [of the Party] is to further release and develop the productive forces and
achieve socialist modernization step by step by carrying out reform in those aspects and
links of the production relations and the superstructure that do not conform to the
development of the productive forces.” See CCP Constitution, Preamble, infra note 117.
62. See LIEBERTHAL, supra note 50, at 127 (stating “Deng [Xiaoping], like most other
twentieth-century Chinese leaders, sought to make the country prosperous and
strong.”); see also SUAN L. SHIRK, THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA
(1993); JONATHAN D. SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA (1999); Richard Baum, The
Road to Tiananman: Chinese Politics in the 1980s, in THE POLITICS OF CHINA: THE ERAS OF
MAO AND DENG (Roderick MacFarquhar ed., 1997); JOHN KING FAIRBANK & MERLE
GOLDMAN, CHINA: A NEW HISTORY (2006); DAVID SHAMBAUGH, CHINA’S COMMUNIST PARTY:
ATROPHY AND ADAPTATION (2008).
63. Zheng Yongnian, The Chinese Communist Party as Organizational Emperor:
Culture, Reproduction and Transformation 16 (2010).
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has built its hegemonic position.”64
After ending the Cultural Revolution in 1976, Deng Xiaoping and his
comrades steered the country toward a different direction by launching a
comprehensive reform program oriented to market economy.  The new pro-
gram, first of all, required the Party-state to withdraw from its former all-
intrusive roles in the life of the whole nation and the people.  In spite of the
risks of undermining the Party’s autocratic power, the reform program was
steadily implemented.  As remarked by David Shambaugh, “Deng’s pro-
gramme changed the very nature of the state from being a proactive agent
of social-political change to being a more passive facilitator of economic
change and reactive arbiter of social-political tensions”.65
In the wake of Mao’s death, Deng Xiaoping arguably had a good
chance of becoming another dictatorial ruler.  Instead, Deng used the
chance to put into practice his beliefs that China could become prosperous
and strong only after firms and individuals in the country were allowed to
pursue their own fortune and to face competitions from the outside
world.66  For example, Lieberthal identified the major motives underlying
Deng’s reform measures and observed that most of them were driven by a
desire to facilitate good policies.67  Another example is China’s accession
to the World Trade Organization (WTO).  In fact, domestic opposition was
at its strongest when the Chinese leadership accepted the packages the U.S.
drafted in 1999.68  Chinese leaders still used the outside pressure from the
WTO as an opportunity to push for bolder and wider domestic economic
and regulatory reform.69  As Lardy remarked, although “[p]olitical leaders
rarely are willing to impose high short-term economic costs in order to
reap benefits in the medium and long term” China appeared to be an
exception.70
Good policy in the contemporary Chinese political context means that
the ruling Party must deliver sustained economic growth, which is one of
the pillars of the Party-state’s legitimacy.  Lardy noted that Chinese elites
have hotly debated many details of the economic reform, but “the view that
economic growth is the sine qua non for retaining political power seems
almost unanimous.”71  At the operational level, good policy pursuance has
led to substantial regulatory reform in China, featuring efforts to improve
legalism, transparency, accountability, and independence in the regulatory
64. Id, at 134.
65. David Shambaugh, The Chinese State in the Post-Mao Era, in DAVID SHAMBAUGH,
THE MODERN CHINESE STATE 163 (Cambridge, ed., 2000).
66. See JONATHAN D. SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA 655 (1999).
67. See LIEBERTHAL, supra note 50, at 129– 30.
68. See Ross P. Buckley & Weihuan Zhou, Navigating Adroitly: China’s Interaction
with the Global Trade, Investment and Financial Regimes 3 (University of New South
Wales, Research Paper No. UNSW Law Research Paper No. 68, 2013), available at http:/
/papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2331843.
69. See Joseph Fewsmith, China and the WTO, 11 NBR ANALYSIS 25 (1999).
70. NICHOLAS R. LARDY, INTEGRATING CHINA INTO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 10 (2002).
71. LARDY, supra norte 70, at 11.
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systems.72
This paper hence argues that the governance practice of China’s SOEs
has incorporated all the elements of legitimacy management above, which
will be examined in detail in the following parts.
II. The Rise, Demise, and Rise Again of Chinese SOEs
One can only appreciate the level of difficulty in reforming Chinese
SOEs by understanding their developmental path since the early stages.
The origins of the PRC SOEs can be traced back to the revolutionary period
before the establishment of the PRC, when the communist Party estab-
lished shops, factories, and banks in territories under its control.73  Rapid
establishment and growth of SOEs started in the 1950s, after the CCP took
over the power of Mainland China.  Through nationalization and expropri-
ation of enterprises and assets that originally belonged to capitalists and
foreign investors in the Republic of China period, SOEs quickly dominated
all aspects of the PRC economy and continued such dominance for several
decades under the planned economy.74  In fact,75
[a]t the start of the economic reform in the late 1970s, Chinese industry was
largely state owned and urban.  In 1978, SOEs delivered 78 percent of indus-
trial output and employed 76 percent of all industrial workers; state firms
also absorbed 84 percent of increments to industrial fixed assets during
1975– 1980.
Before the reform period, traditional SOEs had the following character-
istics.  First, they were not autonomous firms with a separate existence, but
“basic production units run directly by the government.”76  Such an SOE
was part of the government, having the “basic task of carrying out all the
instructions and directives from its superiors” in the government.77  Sec-
ond, SOEs had multiple roles and objectives because they were also “grass-
roots organizations of the party-state political system with extensive social
functions.”78  For the employees, the SOE was a working and social unit
commonly known as the Danwei:79
72. See DALI L. YANG, REMAKING THE CHINESE LEVIATHAN: MARKET TRANSITION AND THE
POLITICS OF GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 251 (2004).
73. See DONG FUREN, ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO JINGJISHI
( ) [THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] 37
(2001); see also WU JINGLIAN, infra note 76, at 139– 40.
74. See DONG FUREN, supra note 73, at 37– 38; see also WU JINGLIAN, infra note 76, at
139– 140.
75. Loren Brandt, Thomas G. Rawski, & John Sutton, China’s Industrial Develop-
ment, in CHINA’S GREAT ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 571 (Loren Brandt & Thomas G.
Rawski ed., 2008).
76. WU JINGLIAN, UNDERSTANDING AND INTERPRETING CHINESE ECONOMIC REFORM 139
(2005).
77. Id. at 140.
78. Id.
79. STOYAN TENEV & CHUNLIN ZHANG, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ENTERPRISE
REFORM IN CHINA: BUILDING THE INSTITUTIONS OF MODERN MARKETS 10 (2002).
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The state regarded SOEs as instruments to achieve its political and economic
objectives, such as to establish a strong military industry and to catch up
with and surpass Western countries.  Therefore, managers of SOEs were
regarded as cadres of the party and were governed in the same way under
the same system as staff of the party and government organs.  Moreover,
SOEs integrated the functions of employment, social security, and social
relief, providing a full spectrum of social services from cradle to grave.80
Third, state ownership in traditional SOEs was shared vertically
among governments at various levels from local to central and was shared
horizontally among different bureaus.81  Fourth, the non-existence of mar-
kets in pre-reform PRC exempted the SOEs from considering supply and
demand as a firm in the market economy must do.  They needed to execute
the instructions of the planners, but they did not need to consider the costs
or profits.  In other words, the SOEs were subject to “soft budget con-
straints,” and the state would always serve as the “last resort” lifesaver to
rescue a troubled SOE.82
The aforesaid traditional attributes have profound implications for
SOE reform today.  First, to the extent that SOE development in China is
path dependent, these attributes are the initial conditions for SOE reform
to address.  Further, some of the characteristics have persisted into the gov-
ernance structures of contemporary SOEs, even though SOEs have been
converted into “modern corporations” according to the Chinese
government.83
Reform started in 1978 to introduce market-oriented incentives with
the aim of granting SOEs some degree of autonomy by allowing them to
retain a portion of the profits (if any), sell output produced in excess of the
plan, and appoint lower-level staff.84  The initial measures were followed by
the “enterprise contracting system,” through which the relevant govern-
ment organs and the SOE management signed a contract entrusting the
management to operate the SOE on the government’s behalf.85  Of course,
SOE managers were neither owners nor professional managers hired by the
SOE.  They were agents hired for the government.  To institutionalize these
reforms, the National People’s Congress (NPC) enacted The Law on Indus-
trial Enterprise Owned by the Whole People, commonly known as the SOE
Law, which still governs the management of the very few SOEs yet to be
corporatized.86
The reform above was, overall, unsuccessful.87  This led the govern-
ment to formally launch a nationwide movement in 1993 towards corpora-
80. WU, supra note 76, at 140– 41.
81. See WU, supra note 76, at 141.
82. WU, supra note 76, at 141– 42.
83. See id. at 151.
84. See TENEV & ZHANG, supra note 79, at 11– 12; see also WU, supra note 76, at
144– 53 (describing the initial SOE reform as “power-delegating and profit-sharing”).
85. See WU, supra note 76, at 146– 48; see also TENEV & ZHANG, supra note 79, at 13.
86. An example of such traditional SOEs existing today is the China Railway Corpo-
ration, which was established in 2013 after the Chinese government dismantled the Min-
istry of Railway.
87. See WU, supra note 76, at 151– 53.
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tization in the aftermath of the famous Southern tour of Deng Xiaoping,
during which Deng called for a radical shift of China’s economic system
from a planned economy to a market economy.  What looks revolutionary
about this stage of reform, at least from a legal perspective, is that it was
preceded by a national law, namely Gongsi Fa, which, adopted in Decem-
ber of 1993, provided a systemic body of rules covering the company from
its incorporation to termination.  In 1994, the State Council, China’s Cen-
tral Government, decided to establish the “modern enterprise system”
(xiandai qiye zhidu), by initially selecting 100 SOEs for corporatization
under the Gongsi Fa.88  In 1999, the CCP Central Committee adopted The
Decision on Several Important Issues Regarding Reform and Development of
State-owned Enterprises,89 which urged the acceleration of the corporatiza-
tion of large and medium-sized SOEs and the privatization of small SOEs.
As Wu Jinglian has summarized:
Corporatization of large and medium-sized SOEs after 1998 basically
included three successive steps: (1) separation of administrative function
and enterprise function; (2) reorganization of monopoly enterprises into
competitive enterprises; and (3) IPO on domestic and overseas securities
markets after asset restructuring.90
The establishment of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Admin-
istration Commission (SASAC) of the State Council in March 2003 marked
a milestone in SOE reform.  SASAC’s main responsibility was to represent
the State Council in order to “exercise the duties and responsibilities of the
state investor.”91  Ostensibly, the creation of SASAC at both the central and
local levels was an effort by the Chinese government to consolidate the
control rights over SOEs.  Before SASAC came into being, the ownership of
SOEs within the government was very fragmented, and many bureaucra-
cies, from central ministries to departments of local governments, had con-
trol over SOEs.  As a centralized representative of the state investor at least
for industrial enterprises, SASAC would “assume a combination of powers
previously dispersed among different ministries and agencies.”92
The majority of Chinese SOEs once faced serious problems in their
economic and financial performances, especially in the 1980s and 1990s.
A 1995 report of the Market Economy Research Centre of the Shanghai
Academy of Social Sciences suggested that a third of the SOEs had been
88. See WU, supra note 76, at 155.
89. See Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Guoyou Qiye Gaige he Fazhan Ruogan Zhongda
Wenti de Jueding ( ) [Decisions of the
CCP Central Committee on Some Major Issues Concerning the Reform and Develop-
ment of State-owned Enterprises], (promulgated by the CCP Central Committee at the
Fourth Plenary Session of the 15th Meeting, Sept. 22, 1999) (China).
[hereinafter “1999 CCP Decisions on SOE Reform”].
90. WU, supra note 76, at 155.
91. DAVID C. DONALD, A FINANCIAL CENTRE FOR TWO EMPIRES: HONG KONG’S CORPO-
RATE, SECURITIES AND TAX LAWS IN ITS TRANSITION FROM BRITAIN TO CHINA 236 (Cambridge
ed., 2014).
92. Barry Naughton, The State Asset Commission: A Powerful New Government
Body, 8 CHINA LEADERSHIP MONITOR 2 (2003).
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suffering losses since the inception of the Reform Era.93  According to a
study by the OECD, the SOE after-tax profit rate (relative to fixed assets)
was close to 18 percent in 1985, but eventually dropped to 0.9 percent in
1998.94  The OECD found, “[t]he proportion of industrial SOE incurring
(after-tax losses) has risen from 31 per cent in 1994 to 42 per cent in 1997
and nearly 50 per cent in 1998.”95
In the 2000s, however, SOEs have been striking back with incredible
financial performances, although their total numbers and share in China’s
economy have been declining.  With the state’s retreat from labor-intensive,
low-value added downstream sectors, the SOEs share in industrial output
and total industrial employment declined from 50 percent and 60 percent,
respectively, in 1998 to 27 percent and 20 percent, respectively, in 2010.96
The number of SOEs dropped from 65,000 to 20,000 during the same
period, reducing their share in the total industry in China from 40 percent
to less than 5 percent.97  However, the Party-state fostered the growth of
SOEs in capital-intensive, upstream sectors, or strategic sectors, including
banking, telecom, energy, and natural resources.  Centrally managed SOEs
are especially successful when measured by growth and profitability.  As a
documentary on SOE produced by the Xinhua, China’s state press agency,
proudly announced,
From 2003 to 2011, SOEs (other than state-owned financial institutions)
realized the annual growth rates of 17.6%, 25.2% and 19.4% in revenue, net
profits and tax, respectively, which were far higher than China’s GDP growth
rates for the same period. . . . In 2012, 69 Chinese SOEs –  of which 53 were
supervised by the SASAC –  made to the list of the Fortune Global 500 in
2012, with CNPC, SINOPEC and China State Grid Corporation included in
the top 10. Nowadays, the monthly profits of the 115 SOEs centrally admin-
istered by the SASAC of the State Council reached RMB100 billion.98
In other words, it would be an error to regard Chinese SOEs as “dying
dinosaurs that continuously absorb resources from the economy but pro-
93. See SASS, Guoyou Kuisun Qiye Pochan, Daobi yu Chanquan Liudong Yanjiu
( ) [Study Report on the Bankruptcy, Close-down
and Property Rights Trading of Loss-suffering SOEs], 6 JINGJI LILUN YU JINGJI GUANLI
( ) [ECON. THEORY & ECON. MGMT.] 13, 13 (1995).
94. OECD, CHINA IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: REFORMING CHINA’S ENTERPRISES 22– 23
(2000).
95. Id. at 24.
96. Sarah Tong & Huang Yanjie, China’s State-owned Enterprises in the Post-Crisis
Era: Development and Dilemma, 694 EAI BACKGROUND BRIEF 7, National University of
Singapore (2012).
97. Id.
98. Xinhua News Agency, Qianli zhi ren, Xing si xingyuan –  Guoziwei Chengli
Shinian Lai Guoyou Qiye Gaige Fazhan Jishi
( ) [A Documentary of
the Reform and Development of SOEs in the Decade after the Establishment of SASAC], May
27, 2013, available at http://vod.sasac.gov.cn/play.jspa?indexid=846&streamid=531
(last visited Feb. 1, 2014) [hereinafter SOE Documentary].
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duce little economic value.”99  Although the SOEs’ share in the economy
continues to decline, SOEs still make up a substantial part of the economy
and dominate the strategic and upstream sectors.  SOEs have also regis-
tered large profits in the past decade.
III. The Twin Governance Structures of SOEs
As noted previously, the existing literature on corporate governance
and control of SOEs has largely focused on the universal elements in the
legal framework of the Gongsi Fa, looking mainly at the interactions among
the shareholders, directors, supervisors and managers, as if the rights and
duties with respect to their relations are mainly or only provided in the
corporate law.100  This is misleading.  This paper argues that SOEs in
China are subject to a system of corporate governance that features two
parallel structures, one for legal governance and the other for political gov-
ernance.  Mechanisms and controls in the legal governance structures stem
from the corporate form based on Gongsi Fa and other relevant state laws,
and resemble those implemented in other jurisdictions.  Political govern-
ance is a CCP-dominated process that actually controls personnel appoint-
ments and decision-making in SOEs.  The two structures run separately,
although the same group of players participates in the decision-making
processes of both structures.  In short, legal governance and political gov-
ernance coexist in the control and operation of Chinese SOEs.  In most
cases, the informal, non-legal, rules in political governance, which run in
the shadows, prevail over the legal rules in China’s corporate and securities
laws.
A. Legal Governance in SOEs: The Law on Paper
Like the company law in most jurisdictions, Gongsi Fa provides a com-
mon structure for business corporations possessing core structural charac-
teristics including legal personality, limited liability, transferable shares or
equity interest, centralized management under a board structure, and
shared ownership by contributors of capital.101  In addition to the Gongsi
Fa, business companies are also subject to a wide range of other laws,
including the PRC Securities Law (Zhengquan Fa), the PRC Law on State-
owned Assets in Enterprises (Guoyou Zichan Fa), Accounting Law, a num-
ber of Administrative Regulations issued by the State Council (which is
China’s Central Government), a voluminous body of ministerial rules for-
mulated by the various ministries under the State Council, as well as, the
self-regulatory rules of the stock exchanges.
99. Xu Gao, State-owned Enterprises in China: How big are they?, https://
blogs.worldbank.org/eastasiapacific/state-owned-enterprises-in-china-how-big-are-they
(last visited Jan. 1, 2014).
100. See Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 10, at 701.
101. KRAAKMAN, supra note 1, at 1 (noting ‘corporate law everywhere must, of neces-
sity, provide for [these characteristics]’).
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Under the Gongsi Fa, business companies take two legal forms: limited
liability company (Youxian Zeren Gongsi, or LLC) and joint stock limited
company (Gufen Youxian Gongsi, or JSLC).102  An LLC is a functional
equivalent of the “private company” under English law or the “closely held
corporation” in the United States.  Its capital, however, is not divided into
equal units in the form of shares (Gupiao).  That is, although members of
the LLC are also called “shareholders” (gudong), the company does not
issue shares to shareholders.  Instead, the percentage of ownership of a
shareholder in the LLC is provided in the shareholders’ agreement and the
company’s articles of association.  In addition, an LLC cannot have more
than 50 shareholders.103  For these reasons, an LLC cannot offer shares to
the public and become a listed company.  In comparison, the JSLC is the
business form for public companies.  Its capital is divided into equal units
in the form of shares, which can be offered to the general public and listed
in a stock exchange.104
The legalized corporate governance structure of a typical Chinese com-
pany features a two-tier board system, and comprises three levels of con-
trols: the shareholders’ general meeting (also known as the general
assembly), a two-tier board system consisting of a board of directors and a
supervisory board, and a (general) manager (chief executive officer or
CEO).105  The general meeting is called the ‘power organ’ (quanli jigou) of
the company,106 indicating that the shareholders in China are more power-
ful than their counterparts in some other jurisdictions.  Indeed, in addition
to the usual power of electing directors and supervisors, the general meet-
ing can also decide the company’s business strategies and investment
plans, although “strategies” and “plans” are never defined in any law.  The
general meeting also has the authority to hear reports from the board of
directors and the supervisory board, and to adopt resolutions as to whether
to approve such reports.  It has similar authority on issues concerning the
company’s financial budgets, profit distribution or the make-up of losses,
amending the company’s articles of association, increasing or decreasing of
the company’s registered capital, the issuance of corporate bonds, and fun-
damental corporate changes such as merger, division, dissolution, and
liquidation.107
The board of directors is the company’s “operational implementation
organ.”108  It reports the general shareholders’ meeting, and it has both the
power and duty to “implement the resolutions” of the general meeting.  It
also has the legal power to establish the internal management structure for
the company, and appoint or remove the key management personnel
including the general manager.  In addition, it is tasked with formulating
102. See Gongsi Fa, supra note 4.
103. See id. at art. 23, 24, 25.
104. See id. at art. 77, 126, 127, 130, 135, 145.
105. See WANG JIANGYU, COMPANY LAW IN CHINA: REGULATION OF BUSINESS ORGANIZA-
TIONS IN A SOCIALIST MARKET ECONOMY 151– 95 (2014).
106. See Gongsi Fa, supra note 4, at art. 37.
107. See Gongsi Fa, supra note 4, at art. 38.
108. OECD (2011), supra note 8, at 18.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\47-3\CIN305.txt unknown Seq: 20 12-JAN-15 9:10
650 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 47
the various reports or plans that are subject to the approval of the general
shareholders’ meeting.109
Listed companies are required to install independent directors on their
board of directors, and those independent directors should constitute at
least a third of the board’s membership.  The independent directors are
empowered by the CSRC to examine and approve major related-Party trans-
actions, propose and convene board meetings and extraordinary general
meetings of the shareholders, independently hire auditors and consultants
to help them perform duties, and launch proxy battles against the
board.110
The supervisory board (SB) supposedly adds another layer of protec-
tion for the interests of the company and shareholders.  The SB both
reports to and is responsible for general shareholders’ meetings, and so is
on the same level as the board of directors in the company’s internal gov-
ernance structure.  Although the SB does not participate in corporate man-
agement, it exercises independent supervisory power over the board of
directors and executive officers, including the power to inspect the com-
pany’s financial status, to propose the removal of any director or senior
executive that has violated relevant laws or rules from office, to convene
general shareholders’ meetings, and, under certain conditions, to initiate
lawsuits against directors and senior executives.111
The 2005 Gongsi Fa confers upon the shareholders a broad array of
rights.  In general, shareholders have the right to transfer their shares,
inspect company documents, participate and vote in the general sharehold-
ers’ meeting, elect and remove directors and supervisors, and sue the com-
pany, directors, and supervisors.  Shareholders are not entitled under the
Gongsi Fa to compulsory profit distribution, but certain CSRC rules make
it compulsory for listed companies to distribute dividends to
shareholders.112
From a legal perspective, directors, supervisors, and senior executives
are responsible to the company and its shareholders under the newly
unveiled framework of legal duties “resembling common law fiduciary
duties.”113  With Articles 148, 149, 150, 152, and 153 of the 2005 Gongsi
109. See Gongsi Fa, supra note 4, at art. 47.
110. See generally China Securities Regulation Commission (CSRC), Guanyu zai
Shangshi Gongsi Jianli Duli Dongshi Zhidu de Zhidao Yijian
( ) [Guidelines for Introducing Independent
Directors to the Board of Directors of Listed Companies], available at http://www.csrc
.gov.cn/pub/newsite/flb/flfg/bmgf/ssgs/gszl/201012/t20101231_189696.html.
111. See Gongsi Fa, supra note 4, art. 54.
112. For instance, the CSRC issued the Provisions on Strengthening the Protection of
the Rights and Interests of the General Public Shareholders in 2004 to order listed com-
panies to implement “proactive profit distribution.” The CSRC’s Guidance for the Arti-
cles of Association of Listed Companies (most recently revised in 2006), which has been
adopted by all listed companies under regulatory pressure, stipulates that shareholders
are to receive dividends or other forms of interest distribution in proportion to their
equity stake in the company. See OECD (2011), supra note 8, at 33.
113. See Nicholas C. Howson, The doctrine that dared not speak its name: Anglo-Ameri-
can fiduciary duties in China’s 2005 company law and case law intimations of prior conver-
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Fa, amongst others, this appears to be the first time that China has system-
atically codified— even if not in its entirety— the scope and enforcement of
common law fiduciary duties in China.  In particular, Article 148 provides
that “[d]irectors, supervisors and senior managers of a company shall
observe laws, administrative regulations and the company’s articles of
association and shall assume the duties of loyalty and diligence to the
company.”114
Most SOEs have been corporatized as companies with the legal struc-
ture described above, and they are thus subject to Gongsi Fa and other rele-
vant laws.  The Chinese SOEs that are listed in the Hong Kong Exchange
(HKE) must be JSLCs established under the Gongsi Fa.115  In theory, all of
the players in the SOEs, including the state-shareholder and other share-
holders, the general manager and its deputies, the chairman and directors
of the board, and the supervisors, are entitled to exercise these rights and
are forced to perform the obligations provided in the Gongsi Fa.  Ideally, in
a country based on the rule of law, the players would only need to act
within the four corners of corporate law.  As discussed below, this is far
from true in China given the political control of SOEs by the Party-state,
even though SOEs still have to comply, at least on the surface, with the
formalities and rules in China’s corporate and securities law.
B. Political Governance in SOEs
1. The Foundation of Political Governance in SOEs
If corporate governance and control in Chinese SOEs only followed
the rule of law, then the following events would occur.  SASAC, or any other
state agency authorized to exercise shareholder rights on behalf of the
state, would, together with any other qualified shareholders, elect the mem-
bers of the board of directors and the supervisory board at the sharehold-
ers’ meeting.  The board of directors, according to Gongsi Fa and its
associated laws, would exercise three categories of powers: (1) the deci-
sional powers to make plans for the company’s business operations, invest-
ment strategies, financial budget, profit distribution, loss recovery, and
fundamental corporate changes, etc.; (2) the appointment powers to select
the company’s corporate executives (including the general manager or
CEO) and decide their compensation; and (3) the oversight powers to mon-
itor the performance of the executives.116
SOEs, however, are not operated this way.  In fact, decision-making for
important matters regarding an SOE is typically in the hands of the CCP,
gence, in TRANSFORMING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN EAST ASIA 198 (Hideki Kanda, Kon-
Sik Kim, & Curtis J. Milhaupt ed., 2008).
114. Gongsi Fa, supra note 4, art. 148.
115. Under the Gongsi Fa, only JSLCs can issue shares and become listed companies.
See Gongsi Fa, supra note 4, arts. 77 and 121.  For discussions on the Chinese legal
framework on mainland companies listed in Hong Kong, see JiangYu Wang, Regulatory
Competition and Cooperation between Securities Markets in Hong Kong and Mainland
China, 4 CAP. MARKETS L. J. 383, 388– 91 (2009).
116. See WANG, supra note 105, at 170.
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which operates through the company’s twin governance structures.
According to the Constitution of the Communist Party of China, the Party’s
leadership role in the country “means mainly political, ideological and
organizational leadership.”117 A 1997 resolution of the CCP Central Com-
mittee elaborated on such “leadership” as follows:118
Maintaining the Party’s political leadership over SOEs is a principle of fun-
damental importance that shall never be shaken and undermined. The polit-
ical leadership of the Party is embodied in the following aspects: adhering to
the Socialist direction of SOEs to ensure that Party’s line, principles, policies
as well as state laws and regulations are thoroughly implemented in SOEs;
adhering to the principle of Party control of the cadres by lawfully selecting
or recommending property representatives on behalf of the state or persons
in charge of managing the SOEs according to the respective administrative
authorities of the Party organizations concerned, as well as, taking charge of
their education, training, evaluation and supervision; and ensuring that the
Party organizations play the role of the political core and that individual
Party members play exemplary roles in SOEs. The emphasis on upholding
the Party’s political leadership of SOEs does not mean that the Party should
act on behalf of or to replace the government or the enterprise.
Insofar as corporate governance and control of SOEs is concerned, an
SOE is controlled by the Party-state through the following four mecha-
nisms: (1) the fundamental discipline of the CCP requires all Party mem-
bers to comply with the Party line; (2) the CCP decides the appointment
and promotion of the top executives of SOEs; (3) Party cells within the
SOEs convene meetings to make important decisions for the company and
to ensure the operation of the company is consistent with the Party line;
and (4) SOE executives accused of wrongdoing are investigated by the CCP
and punished under Party discipline.119 These mechanisms are examined
in detail in the following sections.
2. SASAC as the De Facto State Shareholder
SASAC is customarily called the controlling shareholder,120 but it does
not have such a legal role.  SASAC has the authority to act as the state
117. Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhangcheng ( ) [Constitution of the Chi-
nese Communist Party] (promulgated by the Ninth Nat’l Cong. Communist Party, effec-
tive Apr. 14, 1969, revised by the Eighteenth Nat’l Cong. Communist Party, Nov. 14,
2012) [hereinafter CCP Constitution], Preamble, available at http://www.china.org.cn/
chinese/18da/2012-11/19/content_27156212_2.htm.
118. Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Jinyibu Jiaqiang he Gaijin Guoyou Qiye Dang de
Jianshe Gongzuo de Tongzhi
( ) [Notice of the Central
Committee of the CCP on Further Strengthening and Improving the Party Building Work
in SOEs], (promulgated by the CCP Central Committee, Zhong Fa [1997] 4 Hao, Jan. 24,
1997), Part II, available at http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/71380/71382/71383/
4844844.html [hereinafter 1997 CCP Notice on Party Building in SOEs].
119. See Christopher A. McNally, Strange Bedfellows: Communist Party Institutions and
New Governance Mechanisms in Chinese State Holding Corporations, 4 BUS. & POL. 91
(2002).
120. See e.g., Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 10 (stating that “the law formally recognizes
SASAC as an investor— a shareholder in the national SOEs”).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\47-3\CIN305.txt unknown Seq: 23 12-JAN-15 9:10
2014 The Political Logic of Corporate Governance 653
shareholder in industrial enterprises, but it is not the state shareholder
itself, according to the legal conceptualization of state ownership as envis-
aged in the Qiye Guoyou Zichan Fa, or State Assets Law.121  State assets,
including equity interests in SOEs, belong to the State, namely the Chinese
people as a whole (Quanmin suoyou).122  In essence, the de jure shareholder
is the State, which is otherwise known as the whole people.  The State Coun-
cil, representing the whole people as the “investor,” performs the investor’s
functions and responsibilities, and also enjoys the powers and interests of
the investor.123  The State Council further authorizes— or delegates the
powers to— SASAC to exercise these aforementioned rights, duties, and
responsibilities.124  However, SASAC is not entitled to receive the benefits
ordinarily given to a shareholder.  For example, SASAC cannot take distrib-
uted dividends.  Instead, the dividends distributed to the state shareholder
go directly to the central or local government, and are received by the rele-
vant finance department.  For these reasons, SASAC may be regarded as a
de facto shareholder only insofar as it exercises only some of a share-
holder’s traditional powers.
Corporatized SOEs, including listed SOEs, should in theory comply
with all the rules of China’s national laws.  Legal governance based on cor-
porate law is thus the external aspect of SOE governance under which
SASAC, acting as the de facto shareholder, “represent[s] the people’s gov-
ernment of the same level to receive the earnings from investment, partici-
pate in major decision-making, and elect the management personnel in
accordance with the law.”125  For example, SASAC’s appointment power is
provided by Article 22 of the State Assets Law.  Under Article 22, and in
accordance with national laws made by the National People’s Congress or
its Standing Committee, administrative regulations made by the State
Council, or the articles of association of the SOE, SASAC can: (1) appoint
or remove the general manager, deputy general manager, chief of financial
affairs, and other senior executives of a wholly state-owned enterprise (pre-
sumably not yet corporatized pursuant to the Gongsi Fa); (2) appoint or
remove the chairman and deputy chairman of the board of directors, direc-
tors, chairman of the supervisory board, and supervisors; and (3) propose
candidates for directors and supervisors to the general shareholders’ meet-
ing of a company in which the State has controlling interest or one in
which the State has an equity, but not necessarily controlling, interest.126
As discussed below, SASAC’s actual ability to exercise these legal
rights is subject to tight control by the Party-state regime in China.  In one
sense, SASAC itself is part of the Party-state establishment that is fully con-
121. See Qiye Guoyou Zichan Fa ( ) [Law on State-owned Assets in
Enterprises] (promulgated by the Fifth Session of the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., Oct. 28, 2008, effective May 1, 2009) (China) [hereinafter State Assets Law].
122. See id. art. 3.
123. See id. art. 4.
124. See id. art. 11.
125. State Assets Law, supra note 121, art. 12; see also Gongsi Fa, supra note 4, art. 4.
126. See Interim Regulations on Supervision and Management of State-owned Assets
of Enterprises, art. 12 (2009) [hereinafter Interim Regulations].
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trolled by the CCP.  It is not wrong to say that SASAC exercises share-
holder’s rights on behalf of the Party-state.  This, however, has not
prevented the Party-state from adding several other layers of control in the
SOEs.
3. All CCP Members in SOEs Must Comply with Party Line
The Constitution of the Communist Party of China requires all CCP
members to comply with the Party’s political line.127  The CCP, as a Lenin-
ist Party, practices the basic principles of “democratic centralism,” which is
defined in the CCP Constitution in the following way:128
Individual Party members are subordinate to the Party organization, the
minority is subordinate to the majority, the lower Party organizations are
subordinate to the higher Party organizations, and all the constituent organi-
zations and members of the Party are subordinate to the National Congress
and the Central Committee of the Party.
In particular, Party members have duties, such as studying, under-
standing, and taking the lead in implementing the “Party’s line, principles,
policies and resolutions,” putting “the interest of the Party and the people
[ ] above everything,” abiding by the Party’s discipline, upholding the
Party’s solidarity and unity, maintaining close ties with the masses to
ensure that the Party’s policies are implemented, and collecting public
views and feedback to inform the Party.129
Given that all or most of the top executives and many other employees
at SOEs are CCP members, the obligations imposed upon the Party mem-
bers listed in the previous paragraph have profound implications in the
corporate governance practices of SOEs.  The obligations form a general
and ideological control on the minds and behaviors of CCP members, who,
from the CEO to the factory workers, must, at least in theory, implement
Party policies and execute Party orders faithfully when performing their
duties in a SOE.
This Party-member relationship in SOEs has been most recently
embodied in a political campaign launched by President Xi Jinping that
was aimed at reviving Mao-Era self-criticism in order to bring CCP officials
closer to the people.  In a campaign titled, The Party’s Mass-Line Education
Exercise (Qunzhong Luxian Jiaoyu Shijian), hundreds of millions of CCP
members were required to study the talks and speeches of Xi Jinping, study
the resolutions of the 18th CCP Congress, and convene meetings to “high-
light one another’s faults and confess any transgressions that might under-
mine the [Party’s] credibility among the masses.”130  As some scholars
noted, these meetings represented a crucial element of Xi’s mass-line cam-
127. See CCP Constitution, supra note 117, art. 3.
128. CCP Constitution, supra note 117, art. 10, para. 1.
129. CCP Constitution, supra note 117, art. 3.
130. Dan Levin, China Revives Mao-Era Self-Criticism, but This Kind Bruises Few Egos,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/21/world/
asia/china-revives-mao-era-self-criticism-but-this-kind-bruises-few-egos.html?pagewanted
=all&_r=0; see also Willy Lam, Increasingly Maoist Xi Jinping: campaign to promote princes
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paign, which was “intended to bolster the Party’s legitimacy among a pub-
lic increasingly disgusted by official graft, gross mismanagement and
unseemly activities that involve sex, overpriced liquor or luxury watches,
or sometimes all three.”131  Like all other state agencies and institutions,
SOEs, under SASAC’s umbrella, have been mobilized to participate in the
campaign under the guidance set by Xi.  The central SASAC itself convened
a grand meeting on January 23, 2014, after a series of intra-SASAC meet-
ings of smaller size, to summarize the “intermediate achievements” of such
exercises.132  In the grand meeting, Zhang Yi, who concurrently serves as
the Governor of SASAC, the Secretary of the CCP Committee in SASAC,
and the Director of the Leading Group for promoting Xi’s aforesaid cam-
paign within SASAC, made a four-point statement about SASAC’s own com-
pliance with Xi’s requirements. Zhang emphasized (1) the need for Party
members in SASAC to have “consciousness” in their minds and actions to
implement the CCP’s mass-line; (2) the need for SASAC to strengthen the
CCP practice of “democratic centralism” by better utilizing criticism and
self-criticism amongst Party officials; (3) the need for SASAC to take action
to adopt the results of the campaign; and (4) the need for SASAC to institu-
tionalize the practice of the campaign based on the instructions of Xi Jinpin
and relevant CCP resolutions.133 Indeed, nothing can be more telling for
the importance of Party influence within SOEs than Zhang’s speech on the
“political and ideological” leadership of the Party in the SASAC system.134
4. Party Organizations’ Participation in SOE Decision-Making
Each SOE has at least one Party organization, known either as the
Party Group (dangzu), Party Committee (dangwei), Party Subgroup
(dangzhibu).  The functions of the Party cells in SOEs are defined in the
CCP Constitution as follows:135
In a state-owned or collective enterprise, the primary Party organization acts
as the political nucleus and works for the [better] operation of the enter-
prise.  The primary Party organization guarantees and supervises the imple-
mentation of the principles and policies of the Party and the state in its own
enterprise and backs the meeting of shareholders, board of directors, board
of supervisors and manager (factory director) in the exercise of their relevant
with ‘Red DNA’, ASIA NEWS.IT (July 17, 2013), http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Increas
ingly-Maoist-Xi-Jinping:-campaign-to-promote-princes-with-’Red-DNA’-28494.html.
131. Id.
132. Guoziwei Dangwei Zhaokai Zhishu Jiguan Shenru Kaizhan Dangde Qunzhong
Luxian Jiaoyu Shijian Huodong Zongjie Dahui
( ) [SASAC Head-
quarters Convenes a Grand Summarizing Meeting for Thoroughly Conducting the Cam-
paign for Study and Practice of the Party’s Mass-Line], STATE-OWNED ASSETS SUPERVISION
AND ADMINISTRATION COMMISSION OF THE STATE COUNCIL (Jan. 26, 2014), available at
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n15066072/n15390580/n15390689/15685018.html.
133. Id.
134. See generally PEOPLE’S DAILY, available at http://dangjian.people.com.cn/gq (con-
taining reports of meetings convened by individual SOEs on Party building in SOEs by
the CCP’s flagship newspaper on Party building in SOEs).
135. CCP Constitution, supra note 117, art. 32, para. 2.
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functions and powers according to law.  It relies wholeheartedly on the
workers and office staff, supports the work of the congresses of representa-
tives of workers and office staff and participates in making final decisions
on major questions in the enterprise.  It works to improve its own organiza-
tion and provides leadership over ideological and political work, efforts for
cultural and ethical progress and the trade unions, the Communist Youth
League and other mass organizations.
The responsibilities and powers of the Party organization in an SOE
are more explicitly stated in the 1997 CCP Notice on Party Building in
SOEs, which requires the Party organization to supervise the enterprise in
order to ensure that the CCP line is faithfully implemented, and authorizes
it to “participate in the decision-making on material and important matters
of the SOE and provide support to the factory leader/general manager,
shareholders’ general meeting, board of directors and supervisory board to
perform their duties according to law.”136  Accordingly, the board of direc-
tors or general manager is required to “consult and respect the opinion of
the Party organization” before making any important decisions, and brief
the Party organization on the implementation of said decision.137  Further,
the trade unions, youth leagues, and, to some extent, the workers’ congress
of the SOE are under the leadership of the Party organization.138
To clarify the ambiguities caused by the CCP Notice, the CCP issued a
more detailed decision to institutionalize the Party’s supervision of SOEs
in 2004.139  The 2004 decision was also a response to the excessive inter-
ference of the Party organization in some SOEs and the lack of Party partic-
ipation in others.140  In particular, the decision defines the “material and
important matters” as involving “the SOE’s development strategy, medium-
and long-term planning, production and business operation policies,
annual financial budget and financial accounts, corporate asset restructur-
ing, the drafting of the enterprise’s major reform plans and key rules and
institutions of management, the enterprise’s important personnel arrange-
ments, as well as issues of vital personal interests to the workers.”141
Unfortunately, this definition still seems vague.  The 2004 Joint Opinions
136. The 1997 CCP Notice on Party Building in SOEs, supra note 118.
137. The 1997 CCP Notice on Party Building in SOEs, supra note 118, Part IV.
138. The 1997 CCP Notice on Party Building in SOEs, supra note 118, Part VII.
139. See Guanyu Jiaqiang he Gaijin Zhongyang Qiye Dangjian Gongzuo de Yijian
( ) [Joint Opinions on Strengthening and
Improving Party Building Work in Central SOEs] (promulgated by the CCP Central
Organization Department and SASAC Party Committee (2004), Zhong Ban Fa [2004] 31
Hao, effective Oct. 31, 2004, available at http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/71380/
102565/182143/10993484.html [hereinafter 2004 Joint Opinions on SOE Party Build-
ing Work].
140. See id. See also Li Yizhong, Li Yizhong jiu Liang Buwei ‘Guanyu Jiaqiang he Gaijin
Zhongyang Qiye Dangjan Gongzuo de Yijian’Da Jizhe Wen
( ) [Interview of Li
Yizhong, Secretary of the Party Committee of SASAC, on the Two Ministries’ Joint Opin-
ions on Strengthening and Improving Party Building Work in SOEs], PEOPLE’S DAILY,
Feb. 22, 2005, available at http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n20240/n7291307/92932
86.html.
141. 2004 Joint Opinions on SOE Party Building Work, supra note 139, art. 5, para. 1.
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most clearly set out a number of rules and mechanisms to enable the
Party’s penetration into SOE corporate governance through the cross hold-
ing of positions in the political and legal governance structures, which are
outlined as follows:142
a. As a general principle, SOEs should adopt the governing system of “two-
way access and cross holding of positions” by appointing members of
Party organizations to company’s legal governance institutions.
b. Particularly, in wholly state owned companies and companies in which
the state is the controlling shareholder, the members of the Party commit-
tee can hold positions in the leadership body (banzi) of the company,
which comprises of the board of directors, the supervisory board, and a
group of management executives, according to legally prescribed proce-
dures. Conversely, Party members in the aforesaid leadership body can
also join the Party committee.
c. Typically the role of the Secretary of the Party Committee and the Chair-
man of the board of directors can be assumed by the same person on the
condition that the roles of the Chairman of the board and the general
manager are separated. However, in SOEs without a board of directors,
the Party Secretary can be appointed as the Deputy General Manager,
while the General Manager can serve as the Vice Secretary of the Party
Committee. This does not preclude a single officer from assuming both
the roles of the Party Secretary and the general manager.
d. In SOEs that have already established a proper legal governance struc-
ture, procedural rules should be made to ensure that the Party organiza-
tion can take part in corporate decision-making concerning material and
important matters. That is, the Party organization shall have the chance
to deliberate on those matters, and their decisions or opinions will be
voiced by Party members who serve in the company’s legal governance
institutions including the board of directors, supervisory board and man-
agement team. Implicitly, the aforesaid Party members should cast their
votes according to the decisions or opinions of the Party organization
made in advance of the board meeting.
e. SOEs that do not have a board of directors can also hold joint meetings
between the Party organization and the SOE’s management team in order
to make decisions.
f. After a major corporate decision is made with the participation of the
Party organization, the Party organization shall mobilize Party members
in the SOEs in order to take the lead in implementing the decision.
g. The Party organization shall closely monitor the SOE’s decision-making
on material and important matters. Once it spots anything materially
inconsistent with the Party’s line or policies, state laws, or anything that
is divorced from reality (tuoli shiji), it should advise the management of
the company in a timely manner and report to the higher authorities of
the SOE in case these wrong decisions are not corrected.
The above requirements may look daunting to observers who are used
to the typical Berle and Means corporations.  Essentially, the requirements
142. 2004 Joint Opinions on SOE Party Building Work, supra note 139, art. 5, para. 2.
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turn the SOE’s decision-making body into a political assembly that adopts
the practice of the Party-line vote for members of the CPC, where every
Party member must vote the same way based on the Party’s collective will.
The explicit, naked requirements for incorporating the Party organization’s
views into the decision-making of the company, coupled with the fact that
all or most of the senior executives are often appointed by a competent CCP
organization department, make the SOE an economic entity almost com-
pletely controlled by the CCP.
5. CCP Controlled Personnel Appointment in SOEs
The primary principle of the Party-state’s personnel system is the
Dangguan Ganbu Yuanze (the Principle of Party Control of Cadres),143
under which the CCP dominates the appointment of all state officials in
China.  The CCP, through its Organization and Personnel xitong,144 main-
tains the nomenclature system that covers cadre selection and appointment
in all state-related institutions in China.  It is a unified management system
that “reaches into almost every important nook and cranny in the public
sector of the Chinese system.”145  Through this formidable nomenclature
system, the CCP controls the appointment, ranking, promotion, transfer,
and removal of all but the lowest ranking state officials.
Personnel in SOEs, especially top leaders such as the chairperson and
deputy chairperson of the board of directors or the senior corporate execu-
tives, are managed and openly appointed by the CCP organizational
departments.146  Each SOE is placed in the political system of the Party-
state and given a bureaucratic ranking; the personnel management of SOE
leaders is managed by the organizational department of that bureaucratic
level.147 Specifically, the Joint Opinions of the CCP Central Organization
Department and the SASAC Party Committee articulates the following prin-
ciples with respect to personnel appointment in SOEs:148
a. The Party Controls Cadres system requires the Party organization’s partic-
ipation in the appointment, management and supervision of all SOE
officers above the middle level. The main responsibility of the Party
organization is to set the selection criteria, select the initial candidates,
carefully examine these candidates, and recommend these candidates for
143. See Sebastian Heilmann & Sarah Kirchberger, The Chinese Nomenklatura in
Transition: A Study Based on Internal Cadre Statistics of the Central Organization Depart-
ment of the Chinese Communist Party, CENTER FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC STUDIES, TRIER
UNIVERSITY, GERMANY (2000), http://www.chinapolitik.de/resources/analysis1.pdf.
144. Xitong, literally meaning ‘system,’ is defined as a group of bureaucracies in the
Party-state of China, from the top level to local levels, that handles affairs in particular
spheres.  Kenneth Lieberthal noted that “six Xitong have been particularly important for
concrete management of the country: Party Affairs, Organization and Personnel, Propa-
ganda and Education, Political and Legal Affairs, Finance and Economics, and the Mili-
tary.” See LIEBERTHAL, supra note 50, at 218.
145. LIEBERTHAL, supra note 50, at 221.
146. See John Lee, China’s Economy a Party Plan, HUDSON INSTITUTE (Jan. 5, 2012),
http://www.hudson.org/research/8618-china-rsquo-s-economy-a-Party-plan.
147. See Interim Regulations, supra note 127, art. 12 (2009).
148. 2004 Joint Opinions on SOE Party Building Work, supra note 139, art. 10.
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final appointment. In addition, the Party organization, not the board or
general manager, is in charge of supervising the SOE’s personnel system.
b. In principle, a balance should be maintained between the principle of
Party Control Cadres and the requirements of China’s corporate laws that
authorize the board to appoint managers and the general manager to
appoint lower-level officers. Technically, the selection of personnel can
adopt market-based mechanisms to recruit the most competent and com-
petitive candidates.
c. The appointment of senior corporate executives should follow these steps:
(1) the Party organization department’s examination of the qualifications
of the candidates; (2) the Party Committee’s full deliberation of the candi-
dates; and (3) the appointment of the candidates by the board of directors
based on the recommendation of the Party Committee, following all legal
procedures and formalities.
The personnel of the central SOEs, ranked at either the ministerial
level or vice-ministerial level in the political system, is under the jurisdic-
tion of the CCP Central Organization Department.  From the 117 central
SOEs under SASAC, at least 53 are companies of vice-ministerial level.149
These, however, do not include big state-owned financial institutions such
as banks, insurance companies, and securities companies, which are not
under SASAC’s umbrella but are controlled by the Party-state under a sepa-
rate system.150  As a result, the Central Organization Department directly
appoints all the top leaders of these vice-ministerial-level firms, including
the chairman of the board of directors, chairman of the supervisory board,
the general manager, and other senior executives.151  Although SASAC is
149. See Cao Wei, Fubuji Yangqi Laozong Huo Tiba Shengqian Cheng Changtai
( ) [“It’s Becoming Increasingly Normal for the Top
Leaders of Central SOEs to Get Promoted in Their Political Career”], ZHONGGUO
XINWEN ZHOUKAN ( ) [CHINA NEWSWEEK], Apr. 9, 2012, available at
http://district.ce.cn/newarea/sddy/201204/09/t20120409_23224122.shtml (last vis-
ited Sept. 1, 2013).  So far, only two State-owned companies are ranked at the ministe-
rial level; they are the China Investment Corporation (CIC) and the newly established
China Railway Ltd.
150. Banks are under the supervision of the China Banking Regulatory Commission
(CBRC) and the People’s Bank of China (which is China’s central bank).  Securities com-
panies and insurance companies are respectively supervised by the China Securities
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the China Insurance Regulatory Commission
(CBRC).  Michael F. Martin, China’s Banking System: Issues for Congress, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE (Feb. 20, 2012), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42380.pdf (Banks are
under the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) and the People’s Bank of
China, which is China’s central bank); ABOUT CSRC, CHINA SECURITIES REGULATORY COM-
MISSION (2008), http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/about/ (Securities companies are
supervised by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC)); CIRC HOME,
CHINA INSURANCE REGULATORY COMMISSION, http://www.circ.gov.cn/Default.aspx?alias=
www.circ.gov.cn/english (Insurance companies are supervised by the China Insurance
Regulatory Commission (CIRC)).
151. Although the methods for appointing SOE executives by the CCP is not codified
in the Gongsi Fa or any other national laws, and thus remain as shadows and informal
rules, the Party-state never intended to hide this practice from the public.  In fact, such
appointments are usually reported publicly in newspapers.  For example, ZHONGGUO
BAOXIAN BAO (CHINA INSURANCE DAILY), the flagship newspaper of China’s insur-
ance sector, reported in 2012 that a Deputy Director of the Central Organization Depart-
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theoretically the authorized representative of the State, it has essentially
been deprived of the power to appoint corporate executives and directors in
the centrally controlled SOEs.  SASAC can, of course, still offer advisory
opinions to the Central Organization Department with respect to the rele-
vant appointment or removal of officers in centrally controlled SOEs, but it
has no actual power to appoint or remove these officers.152
Under the unified nomenclature system, the CCP maintains a cadre
rotation system that opens the “revolving door” wide for movement of per-
sonnel between roles as SOE executives and senior government officials or
regulators.  As of 2010, 43 of the 263 governors and vice governors for
China’s provinces and provincial-level municipalities had business back-
grounds.153  Furthermore, 23 of China’s 31 provinces had governors or
vice governors who had worked as SOE executives.154  For these former
executives, the “new positions . . . greatly extend their career ladders in the
party-state hierarchy, bringing them more prestige and a higher political
status.”155 On the other hand, a recent report by the People’s Daily, the
CCP’s newspaper, indicated that the position of senior SOE executive is
merely compensation for senior government officials who do not expect to
be promoted in their political career.156
IV. SOE Governance and Legitimacy Management: Explaining the
Political Logic
A. Reasons for Political Control in SOE Governance
The legitimacy management model can help us understand why the
Party-state adopts a combination of legal governance and political govern-
ance structures for SOEs.  The first and foremost reason involves the
Party’s control of economic resources through SOEs; that control consti-
tutes the financial basis of the CCP regime.  Indeed, SOEs form the most
ment went to PICC and China Life, two of the largest insurance companies in China, to
appoint Mr. Wu Yan as the chairman of the board of PICC, Mr. Lin Fan as the chairman
of the supervisory board of PICC, and Mr. Yang Mingsheng, who was currently a Vice
Chairman of the China Banking Regulatory Commission, as the chairman of the board
of directors of China Life. Zhongzubu Xuanbu Zhongguo Renbao Zhongguo Renshou
Gaoceng Renshi Biandong ( ) [The Central
Organization Department Announces Personnel Changes in PICC and China Life], ZHONG-
GUO BAOXIAN BAO, Mar. 20, 2012, available at http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/
insurance/bxyx/20120320/085411630947.shtml (last visited June 8, 2014).
152. See CHINA NEWSWEEK, supra note 149.
153. Lance L. P. Gore, China Recruits Top SOE Executives into Government: A Different
Breed of Politicians?, BACKGROUND BRIEF NO. 661, EAST ASIAN INSTITUTE, NATIONAL UNIVER-
SITY OF SINGAPORE (2011), http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/BB661.pdf.
154. Id.
155. Id. at ii.
156. See Wan Qian, Yangqi Gaoguan Cheng Shengguan Wuwang Buchang, Dangbuliao
Shengzhang jiu Dang Dongshizhang ( )
[Top Management Positions in Central SOEs became Compensation for Those Who Could
Not Get Promoted in Their Political Career, and Thus if You Cannot become a Provincial
Governor then Come to be a Chairman of the Board of Director of an SOE], RENMIN
RIBAO ( ) [PEOPLE’S DAILY], Jan. 16, 2013, available at http://paper.people
.com.cn/rmrbhwb/html/2013-01/16/content_1186503.htm.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\47-3\CIN305.txt unknown Seq: 31 12-JAN-15 9:10
2014 The Political Logic of Corporate Governance 661
important part of the CCP’s power base, and the CCP itself is fully aware of
the vital importance of SOEs to its rule of China.  Xi Jinping’s famously
stated, “SOEs are an important part of the foundation for our Party to rule
the country.”157  This statement is now extensively quoted and favorably
analyzed by government scholars,158 and has been codified into Party deci-
sions and resolutions.159  Li Rongrong, the first governor of central SASAC,
once verbally conferred the title of “PRC’s eldest son” [gongheguo zhangzi]
upon the SOEs, indicating that they had the greatest financial, social, and
political importance to the Party-state.160
The financial might of SOEs today is beyond doubt.  As noted previ-
ously, although both the total number and share of SOEs in the overall
industrial output in China have declined significantly over the past decade,
they are still the most important pillar of the Chinese economy, with total
estimated assets of RMB32 trillion (approximately USD 5 trillion) in
2012.161  In 2009, SOEs were responsible for 29 percent of the total
employment of urban workers.162  The SOE share of tax revenues has
declined, but it still constituted 48 percent of China’s total tax revenue in
2009.163  Controlling the economic forces of SOEs will thus undoubtedly
improve the governing capacity of the Party-state, at least from a financial
perspective.  Moreover, SOEs are also tools for the Party-state to implement
industrial policies, and they serve as conduits for foreign policy.164
In addition to generating revenue, tight and direct political control
enables the Party-state to use the SOEs to fulfill tasks that an independent
company under market pressure would not be willing to undertake.  As
noted previously, one of the key characteristics of the traditional SOE is
that it has multiple roles and multiple objectives.  To a large extent,
although SOEs are now legally separate economic entities with distinctive
legal personalities under the law, this is still the case today.  Shaomin Li
and Jun Xia’s work, which uses the institutional and principal-agent per-
spective to examine how firms with different ownership structures formu-
late strategies to achieve their goals, reveals that “[Chinese] SOEs tend to
157. Wu Jing, Xi Jinping Qiangdiao yi Gaige Chuangxin Jingshen Tuijin Guoyou Qiye
Dangde Jianshe ( ) [Xin Jinping stresses
the importance of Party building in the spirit of reform and innovation], XINHUA NEWS
AGENCY, Aug. 17, 2009, available at http://www.gov.cn.
158. Numerous research articles on Party building work in SOEs have been published
on SASAC’s website at http://www.sasac.gov.cn.
159. See 2004 Joint Opinions on SOE Party Building Work, supra note 139, at art. 1
(stating that “making the SOEs to play a leading role in the national economy is indis-
pensable in consolidating the Party’s ruling status”).
160. See China News Services, Li Rongrong: Guoqi Wukuiyu Gongheguo Zhangzi Diwei
( ) [‘Li Rongrong says SOEs deserve to be called the
PRC’s eldest son’], NEWSWIRE, Aug. 1, 2009.
161. SASAC, Guozi Jianguan Shinian Lu ( ) [“Ten Years of SASAC
Supervision of State-owned Assets”], http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n15066072/
n15204872/index.html.
162. See ANDREW SZAMOSSZEGI & COLE KYLE, AN ANALYSIS OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES
AND STATE CAPITALISM IN CHINA 17 (2011).
163. See id.
164. See id. at 33– 90.
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adopt strategies conductive to fulfilling administrative tasks or empire-
building.”165  The Party-state’s political control of SOEs is associated with
its treatment of the SOEs as favorites.  Accordingly, “[i]n order to continue
receiving government-allocated resources, SOEs must help fulfill govern-
ment goals and policies in return, rather than solely dedicating [them-
selves] to making profit[s].”166
This phenomenon may have led to agency problems, with the SOEs
having to absorb the corresponding agency costs.  The fact that SOE man-
agers have to follow government orders to undertake political and adminis-
trative tasks will inevitably cause both inefficient use of resources and
managerial indiscretion.167  The Party-state, as both the controlling share-
holder and the regulator of SOEs, actually desires such an approach how-
ever and is even proud of it, as long as this approach helps strengthen its
legitimacy.
An article published on the central SASAC’s website succinctly out-
lined the multiple roles and objectives of contemporary Chinese SOEs.
First, SOEs shoulder the responsibility to “thoroughly implement and
enforce the Party’s line and policies as well as the state’s strategic plan-
ning.”168  That is, irrespective of the economic costs incurred, SOEs must
comply with the Party’s policies and follow the Party’s orders in order to
ensure the Party-state achieves its objectives, which include macro-eco-
nomic management, inflation control, stabilizing the supply of certain
commodities, and international balance of payment.  Second, SOEs have
the responsibility of safeguarding the country’s “economic security,” which
is broadly defined as the control of the strategic sectors concerning state
security and the basic well-being of the people.169  Third, SOEs have the
responsibility to promote the common prosperity of the Chinese people
through a transfer of profits.  The State collects and uses the taxes and
revenues of SOEs to improve the living standards and income of people
who are less well-off.170  Fourth, SOEs have to undertake “significant spe-
cial tasks” (zhongda de teshu renwu) in China’s economic and social devel-
opment; “[i]n recent years, SOEs have come forward and played an
165. Li Shaomin & Xia Jun, The Roles and Performance of State Firms and Non-state
Firms in China’s Economic Transition, 36 WORLD DEV. 39, 41 (2008).
166. Id. at 42.
167. See id.
168. SASAC, Guoyou Qiye Yao Fahui Youshi Dandang Zhengzhi Zeren
( ) [SOEs should Shoulder Political Responsibilities
based on its institutional advantage], http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1271/n20515/
n2697175/15535105.html. [hereinafter SOE Political Responsibility]; see also Li
Yuanchao, Yi Gaige Chuangxin Jingshen Tuijin Guoyou Qiey Dangde Jianshe
( ) [Advancing Party Building in SOEs
with the Spirits of Reform and Innovation], statement of Li Yuanchao (Director of the
Central Organization Department of the CCP), speech at the National Conference on
Party Building Work in SOEs, Aug. 17, 2009, published in Qiushi, No. 17 (2009), availa-
ble at http://www.qstheory.cn/zxdk/2009/200917/200908/t20090831_10488.htm
(Last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
169. See SOE Political Responsibility, supra note 168.
170. See id.
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important role at the crucial moments of all major events in China, includ-
ing China’s major achievements such as the manned space flight, [the] Beij-
ing Olympic Games, [the] Shanghai World Expo, and [the] Guangzhou
Asian Games, as well as the fight against natural disasters such as [ ]snow
and ice disaster[s], [the] Wenchuan earthquake, [the] Yushu earthquake
and [the] Zhouqu landslides.”171
One of these “significant special tasks” is participating in the Party-
state’s natural disaster management.  Under the current system, once a sig-
nificant natural disaster occurs, the State Council immediately mobilizes
the financial and human resources under state control for disaster relief.
Almost all state institutions, including the government, military, armed
police, and SOEs, are asked to help.  According to a Xinhua report, twenty-
four hours after the Qinghai Yushu earthquake hit on April 14, 2010,
China’s big SOEs, including the state-owned airlines and airports, energy
companies, telecoms, transportation firms, medical companies, and agri-
cultural trading companies, were called upon by the CCP Central Commit-
tee and the State Council (Dangzhongyang, Guowuyuan) to participate in
the rescue efforts by providing services and materials.172  In the wake of
the Wenchuan earthquake in 2008, “subsidiaries and branch offices of 20
SOEs around the disaster areas worked closely with the command of the
State Council and took emergency measures to mobilize specialist rescue
equipment[ ] including 936 sets of forklifts, cranes, and other such engi-
neering equipment.”173  Eventually, all the “good deeds” in the relief,
including those contributed by the SOEs, were translated into pronounced
achievements of the Party-state, that showed the government’s capacity to
rule for the benefit of the people (limin) in the Prime Minister’s Work
Report to the National People’s Congress.174
The participation of SOEs in the above-mentioned disaster reliefs was
not without financial and human resource costs.  However, SOEs ordina-
rily are not compensated by the State or those rescued.  One general man-
ager of an SOE in Yunnan Province stated, “Of course we will not ask them
to pay for this but the Party and the state will remember and appreciate our
contribution.”175  It would be fair to say that no privately-owned company
would provide disaster relief on this scale at its own cost.  Mobilizing SOEs
to undertake such tasks, which are important for the Party-state to main-
171. Id.; see also Li Yuanchao (2009), supra note 168.
172. See ‘Guo’ Zi Hao de Dandang – Guoyou Qiye Qinghai Yushu Kangzhen Jiuzai Jishi
( ) [The Will to Assume Responsibilities:
A Documentary on the Performance of SOEs in Qinghai Yushu Earthquake Relief], XINHUA
NEWSWIRE, May 3, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/2010-05/03/c_1271211.htm.
173. MOFCOM, Quake Response: SOEs Lead the Way with Rapid Response and Disaster
Relief, May 13, 2009, http://csr2.mofcom.gov.cn/article/supply/200905/20090506244
460.shtml.
174. See Work Report of the State Council, delivered by Premier Wen Jiabao at the
National People’s Congress, Mar. 5, 2009, available at http://english.gov.cn/official/
2009-03/14/content_1259415.htm.
175. Author’s interview of managers of an SOE from Yunnan, China, (Dec. 10, 2013).
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tain its legitimacy but often run contrary to profit maximization, requires
tight and direct control of the SOEs by the CCP.
B. Legal Governance to Offer Credible Commitment to Private and
Foreign Investors
If tight control of SOEs is necessary for maintaining the legitimacy of
the Party-state, it is potentially curious as to why the CCP has allowed
SOEs to be corporatized.  After all, corporatization of SOEs, initially called
shareholding reform in China, inevitably imposes two restrictions on the
State’s control.  First, the use of the corporate form can dilute the State’s
shareholding, because the corporate form is necessarily associated with
further ownership diversification when non-State shareholders are intro-
duced into the SOE.  Second, use of the corporate form requires the estab-
lishment of a corporate governance structure in the SOE with formal rules
and institutions that limit the Party-state’s ability to intervene in the deci-
sion-making process.
The introduction of the corporate form, viewed as the pursuance of
good policy from the perspective of legitimacy management, arose out of a
practical need: it was necessary to raise funds from other sources— non-
state and foreign— for the SOEs.  The “[p]revious efforts to instill more effi-
ciency into the SOEs,” including efforts to instill power-delegating and
profit-sharing schemes, as well as the contract responsibility system, “had
largely failed.”176  In the wake of the Party-state’s decision to shift to the
“modern enterprise system,” two arguments for introducing the securities
market for SOE reform were advanced by reformers:177
[O]ne was that the securities market could bring private capital to finance
the ailing SOEs, and the other was that securities market could improve cor-
porate governance of SOEs.  Obviously, the first argument is directly related
to concentration of state power, and the second is concerned with good pub-
lic policy.
Ownership diversification and corporate governance are necessarily
associated with a unified treatment of state and non-state investors (if they
are shareholders in the same company), rapid capital market development,
and the protection of shareholders’ property rights.  This “created a
demand for a broad legal and regulatory framework consistent with a rules-
based environment.”178  The promulgated corporate and securities laws
thus help create an impression that the Party-state is willing to offer credi-
ble commitment to protect the interests of investors if investors put their
capital into Chinese enterprises by using legal rules to curb the discretion-
ary interference of corporate affairs.
176. STEPHEN GREEN, CHINA’S STOCKMARKET: A GUIDE TO ITS PROGRESS, PLAYERS AND
PROSPECTS 10 (2003).
177. Wang Jiangyu, The political logic of securities regulation in China, in THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM: CHANGE AND CHALLENGES 232 (Guanghua Yu ed.,
2011).
178. TENEV & ZHANG, supra note 79, at 16.
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In this regard, the adoption of China’s first law in the Reform Era tells
an interesting story. The enactment of the Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ven-
ture Law,179 known as the EJV Law or Hezi Qiye Fa, in the late 1970s was
the result of an arduous but exciting process.  When Li Lanqing, a senior
manager in an automobile factory in China who later became a Deputy
Prime Minister and one of the nine members of the CCP’s powerful
Polibureau Standing Committee, visited General Motors (GM) to invite
technology transfer and direct investment into China, GM offered him an
agreement to establish a joint venture between GM and his factory, on the
condition that China set up a legal framework for such an investment.180
The legal preconditions required by GM were quickly understood and
accepted by the Chinese government, as interviews of senior Chinese offi-
cials later revealed:181
“They would not dare to [invest in China] without our laws [protecting
them]”, said Xiang Chunyi, the Vice Chairman of the Law Commission of
the National People’s Congress Standing Committee.  Xiang further
explained that nobody would put a huge amount of money in a land without
legal protection, and only legal construction could demonstrate China’s
determination and ability to [accommodate foreign investment].  As such, it
was extremely imperative then to adopt laws which could make foreign
investors confident [of China’s investment environment] at that time.
Probably the most telling message about the nature of the EJV Law
was Deng Xiaoping’s description of the law as a “declaration of our [the
Party-state’s] political intent.”182  The EJV Law adopted the corporate form
for foreign-invested enterprises, paving the way for the adoption of the
Company Law in 1993.  What was very clear was that the political intent
behind these laws was to create a legal framework for business organiza-
tions in order to persuade investors that doing business in China was just
like doing business in Western countries, where international best prac-
tices on shareholder protection and corporate governance are in place.
179. See Zhongwai Hezi Jingying Qieye Fa, adopted 1 July 1979 by the 2nd Session of
the 5th National People’s Congress, amended in 1990 and 2001 respectively.
180. See Li Lanqing, Gaige Kaifang Chuqi Guanyu Chuangban Hezi Jingying Qiye de
Jiannan Tansuo ( ) [‘The Hard Exploring Pro-
cess on Establishing Joint Ventures with Foreign Investors at the Early Stage of the Reform
and Opening Up Era’], 6 DANGDE WENXIAN ( ) [CCP LITERATURE] (2008), http://
news.xinhuanet.com/theory/2009-02/06/content_10772265.htm (last visited Feb. 15,
2014) (2008); see also Zhao Xin & Zhang Li, Deng Xiaoping Tan Zhongwai Hezi Qiye Fa:
Shi Zhengzhi Yixiang de Shengming ( )
[‘Deng Xiaoping on EJV Law: It’s a Declaration of Our Political Intent’], http://npc.people
.com.cn/GB/15157/10137795.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2014) (2009); Li Honggu, Deng
Xiaoping De 1979: Heping Jueqi Yuannian ( ) [Deng Xiaop-
ing’s 1979: Peaceful Rise Year One], SANLIAN SHENGHUO ZHOUKAN ( ) [SAN-
LIAN LIFE WEEKLY], Aug. 12, 2004, available at http://www.lifeweek.com.cn/2004/0813/
9518.shtml (last visited Feb. 15, 2014).
181. See Zhao Xin & Zhang Li, supra note 180.
182. Li Lanqing, supra note 180; see also Zhao Xin & Zhang Li, supra note 180.
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V. Implications for Future Reform of SOEs in China
We have examined the twin governance structures in China’s SOEs
and used the legitimacy management theory to explain the rationale
behind those structures.  What does the above analysis tell us about the
future of corporate governance reform for SOEs?  The following three
implications are worth noting.
The first implication is that the political control structure in SOE gov-
ernance is here to stay.  Despite the short-term experiments in the 1990s to
eliminate direct control and ownership,183 the Party-state has created new
institutionalized arrangements to fortify the CCP’s political control in SOE
governance.  As noted above, a number of detailed rules issued jointly by
powerful Party organs and state organs have secured the Party organiza-
tion’s participation in the decision-making process of SOEs, in spite of the
legal rules in corporate law that empower the board to make independent
decisions.  The CCP also monopolizes the appointment of any corporate
officers above the middle level in any SOE, and supervises their training,
evaluation, and promotion.  In addition, Party members in SOEs, including
both executives and workers, must generally follow the CCP’s line and
policies.
From the perspective of maintaining the Party-state’s legitimacy, the
CCP sees tremendous advantages in putting SOEs under tight Party-con-
trol.  Through such control, the Party-state not only receives huge financial
revenues on a yearly basis, but can also direct SOEs to pursue other objec-
tives for the benefit of strengthening the legitimacy of the CCP’s ruling of
the country.  The Party-state can direct SOEs to engage in macro-economic
management, disaster relief, and maintaining state security, while ignoring
the SOEs’ commercial interests.  Without such political control, no enter-
prise that operates on a commercial basis would be willing to pursue those
objectives.
Asking the Party-state to abandon its political control or to privatize
SOEs, an idea enthusiastically promoted by many international and
domestic organizations and scholars,184 appears “too simple, [and] some-
times na¨ıve” at this stage185 for the following reasons.  First, no research or
empirical evidence has convincingly shown that SOEs are doomed to fail.
183. In 1998, in the wake of Premier Zhu Rongji’s reorganization of the government,
the Party-state even ordered all CCP and government administrative organs to sever their
links with the SOEs they control. See TENEV & ZHANG, supra note 79, at 23.
184. See e.g., UNIRULE INST. OF ECON., GUOYOU QIYE DE XINGZHI, BIAOXIAN YU GAIGE
( ) [THE NATURE, PERFORMANCE AND REFORM OF THE STATE-
OWNED ENTERPRISES] (2011); OECD (2000), supra note 9; SHAHID YUSUF, KAORU
NABESHIMA & DWIGHT H. PERKINS, UNDER NEW OWNERSHIP: PRIVATIZING CHINA’S STATE-
OWNED ENTERPRISES (2006); WORLD BANK, 16265-CHA, CHINA’S MANAGEMENT OF ENTER-
PRISE ASSETS: THE STATE AS SHAREHOLDER (1997).
185. “Too simple, sometimes na¨ıve” is a quote from Chinese President Jiang Zemin,
who criticized Hong Kong journalists for asking provocative questions.  This quote has
become satirically popular on the internet in China. See Mark Landler, Leader of China
Angrily Chastises Hong Kong Media, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2000, available at http://www
.nytimes.com/2000/10/29/world/leader-of-china-angrily-chastises-hong-kong-media
.html.
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The global rise of state capitalism, featuring the extraordinary perform-
ance of “national champions” that are mainly state owned, has added
weight to the argument that SOEs, if run well, can be comparatively more
economically successful than some privately-owned companies.  Insofar as
China is concerned, several studies have shown that State involvement in
SOEs is not a problem per se.186  Furthermore, putting aside the debate on
the merits of SOEs, the Party-state simply would not give up SOEs for utili-
tarian reasons: if SOEs are profitable from a business perspective and obe-
dient from a political perspective, there is no incentive to change their
existing governance structures.  After all, the CCP views its political control
over SOEs as one of the SOEs’ core competitive advantages.187
For China’s SOE reform, the current “talk of the town” is the idea of
“mixed ownership.” A resolution adopted by the CCP Centre Committee in
November 2013 has called for a “proactive development of mixed owner-
ship,” which is defined as a type of ownership featuring “crossholding by,
and mutual fusion between, state-owned capital, collective capital and non-
publicly owned capital.”188
It is not entirely clear whether this “mixed ownership” reform will
have any significant impact on the Party’s political control of SOEs.  For the
foreseeable future, it is still safe to say that this reform measure will at least
not weaken the Party-state’s control of SOEs for a simple reason: the mixed-
ownership model concerns mainly limited-ownership reform, which gives
private investors minority ownership but no control.  As some scholars
have observed, “the effects of ownership reform may be limited unless the
state is willing to cede substantial control of mixed ownership enterprises
to private investors.”189  However, it is clear that the aforesaid resolution
mentions nothing about reducing Party control of SOEs— and the Party has
no reason to do so.
A second implication is that China seems to be developing a new
model of SOE governance that combines universal elements of corporate
law with communist political institutions.  While it is still too early to tell
whether this combination will work in the long run, the Party-state seems
to believe that it is a functioning model, at least for the time being and in
the foreseeable future.
As discussed previously, the basic attributes of the Chinese model of
SOE governance, which is comprised of a legal governance structure and a
political governance structure, are as follows.  First, the CCP controls the
186. See e.g., Holz, supra note 9; Chang & Wong, supra note 9; Wong, Opper & Hu,
supra note 9; Qian Sun, Wilson H.S. Tong & Jing Tong, How Does Government Ownership
Affect Firm Performance: Evidence from China’s Privatization Experience, 29 J. BUS. FIN. &
ACCOUNTING 1 (2002).
187. See generally 2004 Joint Opinions on SOE Party Building Work, supra note 139;
SOE Documentary, supra note 98.
188. See CCP Decision on Major Issues (2013), supra note 23, § 6.
189. Marshall W. Meyer & Changqi Wu, Making Ownership Matter: Prospects for
China’s Mixed Ownership Economy, PAULSON POLICY MEMORANDUM, PAULSON INSTITUTE
(2014), available at http://www.paulsoninstitute.org/media/143761/ppm_making_own
ership_matter_meyer_and_wu_english.pdf.
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appointment and promotion of SOE officers above the middle level in
accordance with its personnel management system.  Second, decision-mak-
ing on “material and important matters” concerning the SOE has to go
through both structures.  The political structure, which features meetings
of the SOE’s internal Party organization, considers the issue in question
first and generates Party views or opinions.  The legal governance struc-
ture, consisting of the board of directors and the management team, for-
mally adopts the decision by incorporating the aforesaid Party views and
opinions.  Party members in the legal governance structure are expected to
vote in accordance with the decisions of the Party organization.  Third,
cross-position holding exists between the two structures; the leaders of the
political governance structure also assume senior positions in the legal gov-
ernance structure, and vice versa.  Fourth, once a decision is made, the
political structure will mobilize Party members in the SOE to thoroughly
implement it, and will also report anything inconsistent with the Party line,
policies, or disciplines to the higher authorities.  Finally, despite the rules
in corporate law on fiduciary duties, SOE executives who are Party mem-
bers are first subject to the CCP’s investigation and punishment according
to Party disciplines, rather than the penalties proscribed by corporate law.
From the perspective of the Party-state, this hybrid approach combines
the advantages of state control and international best practices.  The
Party’s political dominance of the SOE helps reduce agency costs, as Party-
appointed SOE officers are subject to Party discipline, which is often more
severe than State laws.  Corruption in SOEs might still be rampant and
widespread, but that corruption was arguably caused by lax enforcement of
Party rules, not by the system itself.  The CCP also believes that this system
is better at selecting capable and loyal executives with good moral charac-
ter, as the selection process for CCP’s personnel system is based on mer-
itocracy.  Furthermore, the co-existence of political governance and legal
governance ensures that the SOEs, to the extent that they are public institu-
tions, generously deploy their resources to achieve multiple objectives so
that people in the whole country can benefit.
A third implication is that the corporate governance of SOEs will con-
tinue to ignore the rights and interests of minority shareholders.  If the
Party-state, as the controlling shareholder, the political leader, and the reg-
ulator, makes decisions independent of and regardless of all other share-
holders, non-state shareholders (if any) of the SOE have virtually no ‘voice’
when it comes to crucial company decisions.190  The strong political gov-
ernance necessarily requires executives to make decisions in favor of the
interests of the Party-state in case there is a conflict between the State and
minority shareholders:191
[G]iven this structure [of political control], what happens when a listed
subsidiary [of an SOE] is faced with two options, one that benefits the finan-
190. See Sonja Opper & Sylvia Schwaag-Serger, Institutional Analysis of Legal Change:
The Case of Corporate Governance in China, 26 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 245, 255 (2008).
191. SZAMOSSZEGI & KYLE, supra note 162, at 77.
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cial interests of shareholders, or one that benefits the national interests of
China as defined by the State Council?  Company management would have
to choose.
The incentives they face ensure that they will choose state interests over
those of non-state shareholders.  The executives of SOE owners are chosen
and/or approved by [the CCP Central Organization Department] and
SASAC, which also determine executive salaries and their career paths.
Their careers and financial success depends on how well they adhere to CCP
priorities and/or government orders. . . . The executives of the listed subsidi-
aries’ main shareholder, therefore, are incentivized to follow what is best for
the state.
In this regard, however, the Party-state seems to face a dilemma that
might eventually undermine its legitimacy.  Enterprise reform over the past
three decades in China has led to the establishment of a sophisticated
framework of corporate and securities laws, featuring impressive investor
protection rules on par with international standards in many respects.  The
1993 and 2005 Gongsi Fa, according to the official line, represent the Party-
state’s determination to move toward a shareholder-centered framework.192
However, under certain circumstances, SOE managers might inevitably fol-
low the Party line and execute government orders by violating corporate
laws (e.g. discriminating against the interests of minority shareholders).
These kinds of violations, if they become a publicly observable pattern,
will undoubtedly weaken the legitimacy of the Party-state.
Conclusion
In this paper I use the theoretical framework of legitimacy manage-
ment to approach corporate governance in SOEs in China.  This paper
argues that Chinese SOEs are subject to twin governance structures, which
combine political governance and legal governance.  It examines how these
two structures interact with each other and explains the rationale of this
hybrid approach.  It also discusses the implications of this approach on the
future development of SOE governance and corporate law development in
China.
The analysis of this paper confirms wisdom that has almost become
conventional today; the effect of a legal transplant cannot be observed
merely from the plain language of the law, although it would also be mis-
leading to ignore the law’s transfer of technical rules and institutions.  In
the realm of SOE governance, corporate laws and institutions which oper-
ate successfully in Western market economies have been transferred into
China by the Party-state to work in tandem with communist political insti-
tutions, but it still too early to tell whether this experiment will be success-
ful and sustainable.
192. See e.g., OECD (2011), supra note 8, at ch. 2 and 3.
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